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1I. Introduction
Since the early 1990s, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has been em-
broiled in a wide-ranging social debate taking place from the legal literature
to the halls of Congress over the proper parameters of its regulatory author-
ity over the drug approval process.' Addressing the many concerns driving the
debate, Dr. David Kessler promised to make the FDA work better and more
eciently when he stepped up to its helm as Commissioner in 1991.2 With that
commitment and with pressure from AIDS activists and Republican members of
Congress, the FDA began reforming its approval process for new drugs in order
to decrease the amount of time required for a new drug to reach the market.
By enacting measures designed to decrease the amount of study
For a sample of this debate, see generally George J. Annas, Faith (Healing,),
Hope
and Charity at the FDA. The Politics of AIDS Drug Trials, 34 VILL. L.
REV. 771 (1989); C.
Frederick Beckner, 111, Note, The FDA 's War on Drugs, 82 GEo. L.J. 529
(1993); John P.
Dillman, Terminal Diseases.' Desperate Times Require Desperate Measures,
44 VAND. L. REV.
925 (1991); Veronica Henry, Problems with Pharmaceutical Regulation in the
United States, 14
J. LEGAL MED. 617 (1993); Eric M. Katz, Europe 's Centralized
New Drug Procedures: Is the
United States Prepared to Keep Pace?, 48 FooD & DRUG L.J. 577 (1993);
John M. Mendelo
Decision Analysis and FDA Drug Review.' A Proposal for 'Shadow' Advisory
Committees, 6
RISK: HEALTH SAFETY & ENV'T 203 (1995); Beth E. Myers,
The Food and Drug
Administration 's Experimental Drug Approval System: Is It Good for Your
Health?, 28 Hous.
L. REv. 309 (1991); Note, FDA Reform and the European Medicines Eval-
uation Agency, 108
HARv. L. REV. 2009 (1995); Elizabeth C. Price, Teaching the Elephant to
Dance.' Privatizing
the FDA Review Process, 51 FooD & DRUG L.J. 651(1996); Julie C. Relihan,
Expediting FDA
Approval of AiDS Drugs.' An International Approach, 13 B.U. INT'L L.J.
229 (1995); Elizabeth
M. Rutherford, The FDA and Privatization | The Drug Approval
Process, 50 FooD & DRUG L.J.
203 (1995); and, Charles J. Walsh and Alissa Pyrich, Rationalizing the Reg-
ulation of Prescription
Drugs and Medical Devices: Perspectives on Private Cerqcation and Tort
Reform, 48
2RUTGERS L. REV. 883 (1996).
The debate has involved all of the FDA's regulatory powers, not merely its
authority over the entrance of new drugs onto the market; however, this paper
will only consider the debate on reform as it relates to the drug approval process.
2 See Price, supra note 1, at 651.
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3that some new drugs must undergo in order to be considered safe and eective
and by reorganizing itsetf internally to ensure faster review of drugs awaiting
approval, the FDA has posted decreases in the amount of time taken for a new
chemical entity to reach the nal stage of approval for marketing.3 This apparent
success has not appeased the agency's critics, however, and commentators have
noted that further reform seems likely.4
An analysis of the current drug approval process as it was implemented
to approve the controversial antidepressant Prozac will demonstrate that the
current system has signicant deciencies which current reform proposals do not
address. For example., the FDA approved Prozac without a good indication that
it would be eective in treating depression and without adequate information on
the adverse eects it would cause.5 The lessons learned about Prozac's process
will show the reforms that are needed in order to remedy some of the current
shortcomings in the system.
An analysis of the controversy surrounding Prozac will also demonstrate
why currently discussed proposals will fail to realize a reformed drug approval
process that is acceptable to the American public. In the midst of the reform
debate, commentators have focused their analyses on the regulatory process
without considering the more informal process of public drug approval.6
See infra, notes 189-197 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Note, supra note I, at 2026 (noting that the restorm of attention
directed at the FDA's drug approval process in recent months strongly suggests
that some change will take place).
See infra, notes 150-153 and accompanying text. See also, infra notes 158-
167 and accompanying text.
6 Infra, part [II.
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4The American experience with Prozac illustrates the eect that this informal
process has on American consumers and demonstrates that the current proposals
for reform are misguided and too narrowly focused in failing to account for it.
In conducting this case study, special attention will be paid to the scientic
issues involved. Failing to consider these issues means that any proposal oered
risks being legal without being scientically valid.7 In developing a reform pro-
posal based on an understanding of Prozac, then, the scientic issues will be
explored in an eort to account for the technical aspects of drug development
and approval
Toward these ends, Part II will outline the current drug approval process.
Part HI will examine the history of Prozac since its introduction onto the market
and will analyze the specic process that Prozac underwent to obtain approval
Part LV will summarize the current state of the debate regarding reform at
the FDA, outlining the major reform proposals currently being advocated and
showing why they are decient. Part V will develop a proposal for reform
that takes account of the lessons learned from Prozac. From this case study
and the lessons learned from experience with Prozac, this paper will conclude
that reform of the FDA's drug approval process should proceed along a careul
course that addresses the reforms needed for specic categories of drugs and
that achieves public acceptance of decisions made by the FDA.
The law, focused as it is on making nal determinations and settling issues
one way or another, continually lags behind science, which concentrates on an
evolving understanding of various phenomena through constant enhancement
of current understandings of existing realities. Thus, a drug approval process,
which obviously deals with scientic issues of drug development, cannot always
keep pace with scientic understandings of drug development. The law is exible
and capable of accommodating new understandings, though; therefore, consid-
eration of the scientic issues involved in drug development and approval is
appropriate and ought to be undertaken as much as possible in order to develop
legal answers that are as accurate as they can be at any given time.
3
5IL The FDA Drug Approval Process
A. Background
The FDA's authority to require premarket testing and approval of new drugs
derives from the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), which man-
dates that no person shall introduce or deliver for introduction into interstate
commerce any new drug, unless an approval of an application. . is eective with
respect to such drug.'4 In order to obtain the approval necessary for marketing,
the application must contain information related to the composition, manufac-
turing and labeling of the drug and reports showing safety and eectiveness of
the drug.9 Once approved, the application becomes eective and the drug may
be sold.
The rationale behind the legislation can be understood as a regulatory re-
sponse to a market failure.10 The failure arises because drug manuThcturers,
interested primarily in getting
8 21 U.S.C.A. x355(a) (West Supp. 1973-1995). A thorough
understanding of the
drug approval process requires understanding not only the rules and regula-
tions of the process but also the historical context in which they were developed;
however, an explication of the historical context exceeds the scope of this pa-
per. For a history of the FDCA and its evolution from a statute granting limited
authority to the FDA to allow new drug applications to become eective to a
statute mandating extensive FDA involvement in the review and approval of
new drugs, see Peter Barton Hurt and Richard A. Merrill, FooD AND DRUG
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 475-487 (1991). See also, James R Nielsen,
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL DRUG LAW 3-12 (2d ed. 1992) (summarizing
the history of federal drug law).
21 U.S.C.A. x355(bXl) (West Supp. 1973-1995). The requirement of ecacy
was added to the statute in 1962 through the Kefauver-Harris Amendments to
the Food and Drug Act, in response to what has been called the thalidomide
tragedy. Hutt and Merrill, supra note 8, at 478. Thalidomide, a drug for
pregnant women, was introduced onto the market in Great Britain, and was
quickly shown to cause severe birth defects in the fetuses of those women. Id at
452.
10 Beckner, supra note 1, at 530 (citing Sidney A. Shapiro and Joseph P.
Tomain,
REGULATORY LAW AND POLICY 467-68 (1993) and Paul J. Quirk, Food
and Drug Administration, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 191, 19 1-192
(James Q. Wilson ed., 1980)).
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6their products onto the market quickly, lack sucient incentive to conduct the
tests necessary to provide full information on their products. Furthermore,
any information available is generally too scientically complex for the average
consumer; thus, the consumer cannot make an informed choice regarding a
proposed drug treatment. A regulatory agency is therefore necessary to facilitate
the consumer's decisions regarding the important elements of a drug choice {
whether the drug is safe for use and eective in treating the intended problem.
The American response has been the creation of an elaborate statutory and
regulatory framework administered by the FDA.
B. The Premarket Approval Process
The regulatory framework established for approving new drugs requires a
sponsor'2 to demonstrate that the drug is both safe and eective. The procedure
for approval can be broken down broadly into three stages: (1) application for
approval to conduct clinical trials of an investigational new drug (ND), (2)
clinical testing and submission of a new drug application
Throughout this paper, the terms patient and consumer~' will be used syn-
onymously, and consumer will never be used to refer to a physician. The dis-
tinction is important to keep in mind. Some authors and drug companies refer
to the physician as the consumer because the physician selects a particular drug
from among the available options. Ultimately, however, it is the patient who
makes the purchase, consumes the drug, and bears any risks and benets associ-
ated with its use. Moreover, except in emergencies, physicians must obtain the
patient's informed consent to any proposed treatment; thus, the patient, theo-
retically at least, makes the actual purchase decision. See Clark C. Havighurst,
HEALTH CARE LAW AND
POLICY: READINGS, NOTES, AND QUESTIONS 18 1-82 (1988) (dis-
cussing the agency problem in the physician-patient relationship).
12 Sponsor is the term given by FDA regulations to the person or agency who
assumes responsibility for compliance with applicable provisions of the [FDCA]
and regulations. The 'sponsor' may be an individual, partnership, corporation,
or government agency and may be a manufacturer, scientic institution, or an
investigator. 21 C.F.R. x310.3(j) (1996). This paper will use the terms sponsor,
company and manuThcturer interchangeably.
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7(NDA), and (3) FDA evaluation of and response to the NDA.
I. [ND Stage
Drug development begins with the identication of a new chemical entity
(NCE) that shows promise as a treatment for some human condition. Under
the FDCA, the FDA may require the sponsor to provide any pre-clinical testing
data that is adequate to justiI~i the proposed clinical testing.13 Therefore, the
NCE undergoes rigorous testing in animals designed to determine whether or
not it has the potential to be safe and eective when used in humans. Currently,
pre-clinical testing takes approximately thirty months and focuses on evaluating
the toxicology'4 and pharmacology15 of the NCE.16 Ultimately, the data from
animal testing must make predictions as to an NCE's safety and its toxicity in
humans and must establish that it is likely to have therapeutic value in humans
17
Having established that the NCE has potential therapeutic value and is
probably safe and eective when used by humans, the company les a Notice
of Claimed Exemption for an Investigational New Drug ([ND), which allows
shipment of the drug in interstate commerce for
13 21 U.S.C.A. x355(kXl) (West 1972).
Toxicology is concerned with toxic substances, detecting them, studying their
chemistry and pharmacological actions, and establishing antidotes and treat-
ment of toxic manifestations, prevention of poisoning, and methods for con-
trolling exposure to harmful substances. TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL
DICTIONARY 1974 (Clayton L. Thomas, ed., 18th ed. 1997).
15 Pharmacology is the study of drugs and their origin, nature, properties,
and eects upon living organisms. Id at 1461.
16 Walsh and Pyrich, supra note 1, at 905.
17 Id (citing 51 Fed. Reg. 36,558 (1986), to be codied at
21 C.F.R x1308).
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8the purpose of conducting clinical trials.'8 The IND must contain all of the
following information:
identication of the drug to be tested; detailed information currently known
about the drug, including information gathered when the drug is used in other
countries; a detailed outline of the proposed clinical investigations that will take
place; and, data from pre-clinical testing, including adequate pharmacology
and toxicology information, that demonstrate that testing in humans will be
reasonably safe.'9 Though the FDA can re.ise to allow an lND to go into eect
it; in its judgment, important information is lacking, the IND generally takes
eect automatically, thirty days after the FDA receives it. Once the [ND is in
eect, the company can begin clinical trials.20
2. Clinical Testing and NDA Stage
Clinical testing proceeds according to the plan outlined in the [ND.2' The
testing begins with Phase I trials, which are designed to determine the metabolism
and pharmacologic actions of the drug in humans, the side eects associated with
increasing doses, and, if possible, to gain early evidence on eectiveness.22 A
small group of healthy volunteers receives the drug, rst in single doses, which,
if tolerated, are followed by administration of multiple doses. The
21 C.F.R. x312.l(a)(1996).
21 C.F.R. x3 12.23 (1996).
20 21 C.F.R x312.40(bXl)(1996).
21 Currently, the FDA has no binding regulations that dene what scientic
methods of testing will be acceptable to the agency. The FDA has issued guide-
lines that establish principles or practices of general applicability related to,
among other things, preclinical and clinical testing procedures and that provide
model protocols for scientic testing. 21 CER. x l0.90(b)( 1) (1996). A sponsor
who uses these model protocols is assured that doing so will be acceptable to
the FDA, but the sponsor is not required to use them. 21 C.F.R xl0.90(bXlXI)
(1996).
22 21 C.F.R x312.21(a)(1996).
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9investigators collect data on the adverse eects associated with the drug and do
not usually concern themselves with determining the drug's ecacy.23
Assuming that no serious adverse eects are found, the sponsor proceeds
with Phase [I trials to evaluate the eectiveness of the drug for a particular
indication or indications in patients
and to determine the common short-term side eects and risks associated
with the drug.24 Small numbers of patients who have the disease the drug is
designed to treat receive the drug and intensive investigations are conducted
analyzing their response it. The tests attempt to determine whether the drug
has the desired therapeutic eect, the dose range at which this eect occurs,
and whether any adverse eects observed will limit the drug's usedness.25
Phase LII trials are intended to gather the additional information about
eectiveness and safety that is needed to evaluate the overall benet-risk rela-
tionship of the drug and to provide an adequate basis for physician labeling.26
In this phase of testing, a larger population sample of patients who have the
disease the drug is intended to treat receive the drug. The sponsor tests the
drug in colvnarative studies, using a placebo or a standard drug treatment,
to determine whether or not the new drug has the intended eect. From these
data, the sponsor makes a determination of what adverse eects will accompany
use of the drug and a preliminary determination of what
23 Hutt and Merrill, supra note 8, at 516.
24 21 C.F.R x312.21(b)(1996).
25 Hutt and Merrill, supra note 8, at 516.
26 21 C.F.R x312.21(c)(1996).
8
10interactions might result from use of the new drug with other medications.
27
After the clinical testing is complete, the sponsor compiles all favorable
and unfavorable information that is known about the drug into an NDA. FDA
regulations require that the NDA include the preclinical data on pharmacology
and toxicology, the results of the clinical test data, an analysis of the risks and
benets that should be considered, and a statistical evaluation of the clinical
data.28 The sponsor then forwards the NDA to the FDA for review.
3. NDA Review
Once the FDA has received the NDA, the NDA is reviewed by one of ve
of the Oces of Drug Evaluation. Each of these oces oversees the review and
approval of drugs for certain medical conditions.29 The FDA has 180 days30
from receipt of an NDA to review and take action on it. FDA approval requires
primarily that the preclinical and clinical test data show that the
drug is safe for use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or sug-
gested in the
labeling3' and that there be substantial evidence that the drug will have
the eect it purports to or is represented to have under the conditions of use
prescribed, recommended, or suggested in
27 Hurt and Merrill, supra note 8, at 516.
28 21 C.F.R x314.50(d)(1996).
29 Tamar Nordenb erg, Inside FDA: The Center for Drug Evaluation and Re-
search, FDA CONSuMER, July-Aug. 1996, available at http://www.fda.gov/fdac/features/696 cder.html.
30 21 U.S.C.A. x355(cXl)(West Supp. 1973-1995). Theperiodforreviewcanbe
extended for longer than 180 days if the applicant agrees. 21 C.F.R x3 14.
100(c) (1996).
31 21 U.S.C.A. x355(dXl) (West Supp. 1973-1995).
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11the labeling.32 The statute denes substantial evidence as evidence consisting
of adequate and well-controlled investigations, including clinical investigations
undertaken by experts in the eld.33 The FDA has interpreted the statutory
requirement of adequate and well-controlled investigations to mean that the
sponsor must provide at least two adequate and well-controlled studies showing
ecacy in order for the drug to be approved.
If the FDA's review shows that the drug is safe, that two studies nd that
it is eective, and that other requirements, such as for manuThcturing and
labeling, meet statutory standards, the FDA will issue the sponsor an approval
letter, which permits marketing of the drug.34 In some cases, the FDA may
believe that it can approve the NDA provided certain outstanding issues are
solved. In that situation, the FDA will issue an approvable letter. Approvable
letters are sent if the [NDA] substantially meets [FDA] requirements and the
agency believes that it can approve the [NDA] if specic additional information
or material is submitted or specic conditions (for example, certain changes in
labeling) are agreed to by the [sponsor].35 The sponsor must respond within ten
days and, upon response, the review period is extended for 45 days.36
32 21 U.S.C.A. x355(dX5) (West Supp. 1973-1995).
21 U.S.C.A. x355(d) (West Supp. 1973-1995). Adequate and well-controlled
investigations are dened by regulation. 21 C.F.R x312.125 (1996). It has
been suggested that the substantial evidence burden of proof for ecacy is
somewhat low and not intended to erect an insurmountable barrier for promising
new drugs. Note, supra note I, at 2019 (explaining that in adopting the 1962
Kefauver-Harris Amendments, Congress rejected a higher preponderance of the
evidence standard in favor of substantial evidence).
21 C.F.R x3 14. 105 (1996).
21 C.F.R x314.ll0(a)(1996).
36 Id
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12The FDA will refuse to approve an NDA if the drug is not proved to be both safe
and eective. The FDA may also refuse to approve an NDA on other grounds,
such as the failure of the manufacturing and processing methods to insure that
the drug retains its identity, strength, quality and purityj omission of data, or
failure to correct prior deciencies.38 If the application is not approved, the
applicant receives notice and an opportunity for a hearing.39
C. Postmarketmg Regulation
After approval of an NDA and marketing of the new drug, the drug's sponsor
continues to have responsibilities to the FDA. In some cases, the FDA will
condition its approval on the sponsor's agreeing to conduct long-term studies to
determine the drug's eects in chronic-use patients.40 These tests, called Phase
IV trials, are used when long-term safety and eectiveness data is needed but
the necessity of the drug or its potential benet does not justif~' a delay in
putting the drug on the market.
By law, the manufacturers, packers and distributors of drugs must main-
tain records and make reports to the FDA of adverse eects4' that occur in
connection with the use of the new
21 U.S.C.A. x355(dX3) (West Supp. 1973-1995).
38 21 C.F.R. x3 14. 125 (1996).
21 U.S.C.A. x355(d) (West Supp. 1973-1995).
40 21 C.F.R. x310.303 (1996).
Adverse eects are symptoms or problems that develop in connection with
the use of a drug. They are called adverse eects, adverse events, adverse
experiences, or side eects. Adverse drug reactions (ADRs) are adverse events
that are causally linked with the use of a drug.
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13drug and of therapeutic failure of the drug.'2 Reports to the FDA of serious ad-
verse eects must occur within fteen days of a health professional or consumer
reporting an adverse eect to the company. The company must review all re-
ports received at least annually and submit reports to the FDA of that review.'3
The FDA requires these reports and records in order to provide it with the data
necessary to determine whether or not there are grounds for withdrawing the
drug from the market. If any new evidence indicates that the drug is unsafe
or ineective, the FDA will require the sponsor to withdraw the drug from the
market.'4
In addition to requiring reports of adverse eects from the drug companies
themselves, the FDA also accepts reports of adverse eects from health care pro-
fessionals and consumers. Called spontaneous reporting or voluntary reporting,
health care professionals and consumers have always been able to contact the
FDA with reports of adverse events that occurred while a patient/consumer
was taking a drug or using a medical device. The FDA has focused its eorts,
though, on obtaining reports from health professionals rather than consumers.
In 1993, the FDA, concerned that health professionals were not reporting
ADRs, renewed its commitment to accepting such reports and began a pro-
gram designed to encourage and suniulate the reporting of adverse drug events
by physicians and other health professionals. Toward this end, the FDA an-
nounced in the Federal Register a new form for reporting adverse eects as
part of its new MEDWATCH, Medical Products Reporting Program, which has
as its primary focus to inform and encourage health professionals (physicians,
physician assistants,
42 21 C.F.R x310.305(a)(1996).
21 C.F.R x310.305(c) (1996).
21 U.S.C.A. x355(e) (West Supp. 1973-1995).
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14pharmacists, nurses, and others) about reporting serious adverse events and
product problems.5 The FDA began this program because voluntary reports
from health care professionals are
an essential means of facilitating the FDA's monitoring of the safety of the
drugs on the market.46 By providing an easier form to use for reporting and by
embarking on a nationwide education program for health care professionals on
the importance of reporting, the FDA hoped to stimulate voluntary reporting.47
To implement the new program, the FDA has used many strategies: presenta-
tions and exhibits at the conferences and meetings of health professional associa-
tions, explaining MED WATCH and the importance of reporting; development
and implementation of training curricula for health professionals to educate
them on detecting ADRs; distribution of a single, postage-paid form for report-
ing all types of adverse drug and device eects; and improvement of the feedback
system for MEDWATCH, by providing regular updates on product problems
through the FDA Medical Bulletin and a quarterly MEDWATCH update48
58 Fed. Reg. 31596, 31596 (1993).
46 David A. Kessler, Introducing MED Watch.' A New Approach to Report-
ing Medication and Device Adverse Eects and Product Problems, 269 JAMA
2765, 2765 (1993). MEDWATCH does not appear to focus its eorts on infor-
mation relating to ecacy. Health professionals are encouraged to report only
serious, adverse events, dened infra, related to drug usage, suggesting that the
primary purpose of the program is to monitor the safety of drugs on the market.
58 Fed. Reg. 31596, 31597 (1993). Compared with other countries that
operate a voluntary reporting system, US reporting rates have been very low.
Gerald A. Faich, Adverse Drug-Reaction Monitoring, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1589, 1592 (1986) ('The rate of adverse-reaction reporting in the United States
is far below that in many other developed countries) (citation omitted). Dr.
Kessler estimated that only one percent of serious adverse events are reported
to the FDA. Kessler, supra note 46, at 2765 (citation omitted).
48 Justina A. Moizon, The FDA 's Perspective on the Future of Pharmacy,
44 DRAKE
L. REv. 463, 467-8 (1996). As technology has become available, the FDA
has implemented (continued...)
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15The FDA encourages only the reporting of serious adverse eects, which it
denes as those cases in which the physician suspects that an FDA-regulated
product was associated with a serious outcome { death, a life-threatening con-
dition, initial or prolonged hospitalization, disability, or congenital anomaly, or
when intervention was required to prevent permanent impairment or damage.'9
The FDA also emphasizes reporting events that occur with drugs that have been
on the market for less than three years, because this appears to be the criti-
cal time period in which most serious problems are discovered.50 Though the
FDA considers the program voluntary, various organizations within the medical
community have begun imposing an obligation on their members to make MED
WATCH reports.51
The FDA has recently amended its regulations to preempt state and local
laws that might require or permit disclosure of the identities of those who report
adverse events to either the FDA
48( .. continued)
electronic means of ling reports, such as providing a toll-free fax number.
Forms for reporting can also be obtained on the Internet. See MEDWATCH
Home Page. at http://www.fda.govmedwatch/report/hcp.htm.
Kessler, supra note 46, at 2768.
SO Id
The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JC-
AHO), the primary accrediting organization for hospitals and health mainte-
nance organizations (HMOs), requires its organizations to set up a system for
reporting adverse drug events in order to receive accreditation. American Med-
ical Association, Reporting Adverse Drug and Medical Device Events.' Report
of the AkL4 's Council on Ethical and Judicial Aairs, 49 FooD & DRUG L.J.
359, 362 (1994). Additionally, the American Medical Association has amended
Principle V of its Code of Medical Ethics to impose an ethical obligation on
physicians to report adverse reactions to the appropriate authorities. Id at 3
62-3. The FDA encourages medical professionals to regard reporting as a fun-
damental professional and public health responsibility, Kessler, supra note 46,
at 2767, but does not impose the obligation.
14
16or the manufacturer.52 The regulation now gives the FDA complete authority to
protect the condentiality of adverse reaction reports. The FDA promulgated
it in part to encourage adverse reaction reporting, because it was generally
assumed that low US reporting rates were linked with physicians' fears that the
report would constitute an admission of liability for a patient's drug injury if
the report were discovered in a medical malpractice suit.53 Despite assurances
from the FDA that it would protect a MED WATCH reporter's condentiality,54
reporters now receive absolute protection from having their identities released
in connection with an adverse reaction report.
The FDA has made no systematic attempt to collect adverse reaction reports
from consumers,55 and a program similar to MIEDWATCH for consumers does
not currently exist. The FDA's position on consumer reporting has been to
accept reports from consumers but to
52 60 Fed. Reg. 16962 (1995).
H. Denman Scott et at, Physician Reporting of Adverse Drug Reac-
tions.' Results of the Rhode Island Adverse Drug Reaction Reporting Project,
263 JAMA 1785, 1786 (1990) (discussing reasons behind health care profession-
als' failure to report adverse drug reactions).
Kessler, supra note 46, at 2767 ...... the FDA carefully protects the identities
of providers who report. ... [The FDA] has participated in a number of court
cases vigorously opposing release of the names of those involved in adverse event
reports. To date, we have been successful in maintaining the condentiality of
this information in all the cases in which we have been involved).
There have been some studies conducted to determine the feasibility and
reliability of consumer reports, in which adverse reaction reports were collected
directly from consumers. See infra, notes 285-296 and accompanying text. In
addition, the FDA's MEDWATCH Home Page on the Internet provides in-
structions to consumers for ling adverse event reports. Consumers are en-
couraged to le their reports through their physician, by downloading a report
form and taking it to their physician. If the consumer does not wish to go
through the physician to le, the Home Page provides instructions for down-
loading the form and lling it out. MEDWATCH Home Page, available at
http://www.fda.gov/medwatch/report/consumer/ consumer.htm.
15
17encourage consumers to report through their physicians and to make no eort
to stimulate consumer reporting. The agency has stated that consumers are
encouraged to work with their health professionals to submit the MED WATCH
form.56
111. The History of Prozac
In addition to the regulatory process of drug approval, new drugs also undergo
an informal process of public drug approval that determines whether or not
the FDA's judgments about safety and ecacy will be upheld. A survey of
the history of Prozac since FDA approval shows that this process has huge
social costs because the results are often mixed. Following Prozac's approval
for marketing in December 1987, controversy over its safety led consumers to
question their physicianst judgment, forced Prozac's manufacturer57 to pour out
resources to defend the drug in court and in the media, caused the FDA to waste
resources justiFying its ndings about the safety and ecacy of Pro zac, and
made physicians defend themselves against malpractice liability for prescribing
a drug that had already undergone an elaborate and expensive procedure to
establish the propriety of prescribing it.
Prozac was the rst of a new class of drugs called selective serotonin reuptake
inhibitors (SSRIs) to be approved by the FDA.58 The development process for
Prozac~ was expensive and
56 58 Fed. Reg. 31596, 31599 (1993).
Prozac's manufacturer was Eli Lilly & Company (hereinafter Lilly).
58 SSRIs make more serotonin available in the brain by acting to inhibit the
uptake of serotonin, a neurotransmitter in the brain. Known chemically as 5-
hydroxytryptamine, serotonm is one of many neurotransmitters, substance[s]...
manufactured by a cell. Michael K. Trimble, BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY
68 (2d ed. 1996). A neuron releases a neurotransmitter and transmits it to
another neuron, thereby causing the second neuron to re. The ring of neurons
drives activity in the brain, making human voluntary and involuntary functions
possible. See id at 41-75
(continued...)
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18time-consuming. Prozac spent fteen years and seven months in development
before receiving approval from the FDA to be marketed in the United States.
Discovered in May 1972, the rst results of animal tests were not published
until two years after discovery.60 Seven years of clinical testing followed after
two additional years of preclinical animal testing, and in the fall of 1983 Lilly
submitted an NDA for uoxetine.6' Once the NDA reached the FDA, the drug
spent four years awaiting approval. By October 1985, the Psychopharmacologi-
cal Drugs Advisory Committee, a panel of experts responsible for reviewing the
data submitted on new psychopharmacological drugs and recommending action
to the FDA, had recommended approval,62 but the FDA did not indicate that
the application for uoxetine was approvable until
S8( .continued)
(providing a basic understanding of the physiology and chemistry of the
brain). For an
explanation of SSRls and their action on neurotransmitters, see B.E. Leonard,
Second Generation
Antidepressants. Chemical Diversity but Unity ofAction?, in PSYCHOPHAR-
MACOLOGY OF
DEPRESSION (Stuart A. Montgomery and Timothy H. Corn, eds., 1994).
Scientists believe that serotonin levels are linked with depression, see infra,
note 171 and accompanying text; thus, by making more serotonin available in
the brain, SSRIs combat a patient's depression.
Prozac is the brand name for the chemical compound uoxetine, which, when
synthesized for human use, is labeled uoxetine HCI. Throughout this paper, the
term uoxetine will be used in lieu of Prozac when discussing scientic evidence
or medical information, as this is the name scientists use in their discussion
papers. The use of the name Prozac will refer to the drug as prescribed and as
it is known by the American public.
60 Jerrold F. Rosenbau.m, Clinical Trial by Media: The Prozac Story, in
PSYCHIATRIC PRACTICE UNDER FIRE: THE INFLUENCE OF GOV-
ERNMENT, THE MEDIA AND SPECIAL INTERESTS ON SOMATIC THER-
APIES 3, 6 (Harold I. Schwartz, ed., 1994).
61 Id.
62 Id
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19September 1987.63 Final approval followed in December 1987.
A. The Rise and Fall of Prozac
At rst, the informal process of public approval accepted Prozac. The drug
posted record sales and attracted unprecedented public attention. By the end
of 1988, after Prozac had been on the market for only one year, the new drug
was posting sales of$ 125 millionf4 At the end of 1989, Prozac's sales volume
had increased by 280%, up to $350 million for the year.65 Analysts projected
that Prozac would bring in $500 million in 1990 and over $1 billion annually by
199Sf6
Driving Prozac's sales growth was its popularity with physicians, who tended
to prefer it over the older antidepressants because of two signicant adx antages.
First, Prozac caused none of the uncomfortable side eects, such as dry mouth,
blurred vision, racing heartbeat, constipation, cognitive impairment and weight
gain, that were associated with older antidepressants and that discouraged pa-
tients from continuing with those medications.67 While Prozac was associated
with some side eects, including nervousness, insomnia and gastrointestinal dis-
tress, patients generally tolerated these symptoms better. As a result, patients
were more compliant with drug therapy, remaining on the drug until there was
a therapeutic
63 Judith Valente, Eli Lilly's New Antidepressant Drug Clears FDA Hurdle,
Stock Jumps $10, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 1987, available in WESTLAW, 1987
WL-WSJ 304484.
64 Georey Cowley, The Promise of Prozac, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 26, 1990,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws le.
65 Id
66 Id
67 Rosenbaum, supra note 60, at 6.
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20eect.68 Consequently, treatment for depression was more likely to be successful.
A second major advantage of Prozac was the inability of a patient to use the
drug to commit suicide.69 Physicians thus felt much freer to prescribe the drug
to their patients, some of whom may be suicidal, because of the reduced risk
that the medication could be abused. ~
The public also began to seek out Prozac, asking their physicians to prescribe
it for them and, in some cases, switching physicians if they were turned down.71
By the end of 1990, approximately three million patients had taken or were
taking Prozac.72 Media attention, with its promises of miracles, had fanned the
ames and sparked intense public interest in Prozac. Responding to the record
sales and the signicant advancement in the treatment of depression, the media
began to aunt the virtues of Prozac. New York Magazine73 and Newsweek74
both extolled the virtues of Prozac and stories began to emerge of patients,
previously incurable, for whom Prozac had worked a miracle.75 Though the
reports generally presented a balanced consideration
68 Id Antidepressant drug therapy is generally believed to require several
months of treatment before a patient's depression lifts. See infra, note 132.
69 See infra, notes 133-136 and accompanying text.
70 Cowley, supra note 64.
71 Id
72 Rosenbaum, supra note 60, at 10.
Rosenbaum, supra note 60 (citing F. Schumer, Bye-Bye Blues: A New Won-
der Drug for Depression, NEW YORK MAGAZINE, Dec. 18, 1989).
Cowley, supra note 64.
See, e.g., Cowley, supra note 64. For example, included in the NEWSWEEK
article was the story of a 39-year-old woman who had suered most of her life
with depression and bulimia. No other treatment had relieved her suering;
however, within a month of taking
(continued...)
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21of the risks and benets of Prozac, the media drew the conclusion that in spite of
possible side eects, Prozac was a big improvement over older antidepressants.76
Simultaneously, media attention began to focus on a study by Harvard Medi-
cal School physicians that created a storm of public controversy about the safety
of Prozac, causing the drug to suer increasing public disapprovaL The study
suggested that in rare cases, patients taking Prozac became suicidal, manic
or violent.77 The authors, psychiatrists at McLean Hospital in Belmont, Mas-
sachusetts, described six psychiatric inpatients who had received Prozac during
their course of treatment at the hospital. The study said that each of the six
patients developed obsessively intense thoughts of suicidal and violent behavior
that abated only after discontinuation of Prozac.78
Within months of the rst media accounts of the Teicher study, Prozac
suered from public disapproval that cost Lilly, consumers, and the FDA a
substantial amount. The media had picked up the story of problems associated
with Prozac. Individuals, believing that Prozac had severely harmed them while
they were taking it, formed a nationwide support network for all who
75( ..continued)
Prozac, she enthusiastically claimed to be 1,000% better, taking on things
she never would have before taking the drug. Id Other stories reported in the
media describe similar miraculous cures.
76 Cowley, supra note 64.
Martin H. Teicher et at, Emergence of Intense Suicidal Preoccupations Dur-
ing Fluoxe tine Treatment, 147 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 207 (1990) [hereinafter
Teicher study]. The study provided only anecdotal evidence of the experience
of these six patients and did not draw the specic conclusion of a causal link
between Prozac and violence.
78 Id at 209.
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22believed they had been victimized by the drug.79 Others led a series of law-
suits, on their own behalf or on behalf of family members who had committed
violent acts while taking Prozac, using the Teicher study as evidence of the fact
that Lilly knew or should have known that Prozac was dangerous.80 Though
Dr. Teicher himself was reported as saying that his study was not conclusive,8'
the alarm about the safety of Prozac began to escalate. Reports to the FDA of
adverse reactions to Prozac increased astronomically,~ and articles began to ap-
pear throughout the nation's newspapers about the alleged link between Prozac
and violent behavior. One of the popular anecdotes used to show Prozac's de-
structive power was the case of Joseph Wesbecker, a former press operator in
Louisville, Kentucky. Wesbecker, who was being treated with Prozac, opened
re with an AK-47 at his workplace, shooting twenty of his co-workers and
killing nine, including himseW in September 1989Y Three widows of the eight
workers killed led suit
Allen G. Breed, Ex-Users of Prozac Form Support Group, THE COURIER-
J. (Louisville, Ken.), June 3, 1990, available in WESTLAW, 1990 WL 4474366.
80 Em Marcus, Is It Really the Wonder Drug for Depression?, WASH. POST,
Aug.
28, 1990, available in WESTLAW, 1990 WL 2112864. The article was pub-
lished on August 28
and reported that more than half a dozen lawsuits had been led in the past
month, Id, just
four months after Cowle~s article in NEWSWEEK, supra note 64.
See Demitri Papolos and Janice Papolos, OVERCOMING DEPRESSION
162 (rev. ed.
1992).
Between June 3, 1990, when THE COURIER JOURNAL (Louisville, Ken.)
reported
on the founding of the Prozac Survivors Support Group, see Breed, supra
note 79, and August 3,
1990, the date the WASHINGTON POST obtained data from the FDA, see
Marcus, supra note 80,
reports of adverse reactions had risen from 7,000 to 8,900. That increase repre-
sents an average
of 31.6 calls to the FDA each day, including weekends, during the sixty days
between June 3 and
August 3.
83 Marcus, supra note 80. The story is detailed in many of the media reports
on Prozac in late 1990 and 1991 and varies slightly in some of the minor details.
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23against Lilly for $50 million each in September 1990, alleging that Prozac was
unsafe and dangerous.84
Wesbecker's case attracted the attention of the Church of Scientology (the
Church), a group known to be opposed to psychiatric treatment. The Church
launched a vigorous campaign to discredit Prozac and ultimately became re-
sponsible for Prozac's slide from fame and fortune.85 Their tactics included
providing information and scientic data to plaintis suing Lilly, appearing on
talk shows, and spending $2 million on advertisements attacking Prozac.86
As a result of all the negative publicity, Prozac's sales dropped, as did Lilly's
market share of antidepressant sales for Lilly.87 Just as they had demanded to
be put on the drug, patients responded to the media battle by taking themselves
o Prozac and by refusing it when their physicians recommended it88 Patients
making these decisions for themselves often did so at their
8.4 Rosenbaum, supra note 60, at 10.
85 Paula Span, A Dose of Controversy, DET. NEWs, Aug. 29, 1991, avail-
able in WESTLAW, 1991 WL 4661317 (reporting that the Church's attack
caused most of the public furor over Prozac). For a thorough review of the
Church's role in undermining public condence in the drug, see Catherine M.
Vale, The Rise and Fall of Prozac: Products Liability Cases and The Prozac
Defense in CriminalLitigation, 12 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 525, 536-39
(1993).
86 Michael Tackett, Scientologist Campaign Shakes Drug Firm, Cm. TRIB.,
June 30,
1991, available in WESTLAW, 1991 WL 9390370. The Church's pressure
was intense. Full-page advertisements in USA TODAY ran for two weeks at-
tacking Lilly. A third week of advertisements promoted the Church and included
glossy inserts critical of Lilly. Id
87 Id
88 Rosenbaum, supra note 60, at 10-11. As an example of this phenomenon,
Dr. Rosenbaum reprinted the following letter received by a colleague:
Dear Doctor,
(continued...)
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own peril89 Eventually, Lilly responded by launching its own aggressive legal
strategy to combat public relations problems, which included oers to pay all
legal costs for physicians sued for malpractice after prescribing Prozac and oers
to assist prosecutors by providing data and expert witnesses when criminal
defendants used Prozac as a defense. 90
Throughout the controversy, the FDA maintained that Prozac was safe and
eective.9' Nonetheless, under pressure from the Citizens Commission on Hu-
man Rights (CCHR), the arm of the Church dedicated to exposing psychiatric
abuses, the FDA convened its
88(.. . continued)
I wish to discontinue my Prozac. I watched the Joan Rivers show yesterday
and even though you had given me the paper explaining those negative things
about Prozac, this program really gave me second thoughts.
I will just try harder to get myself together, to get to more Al-Anon meetings
and hope for the best. I have limited medical coverage and I came to you with
sincere hopes. Thank you for considering me, sorry for any inconvenience.
Id at 11. The letter shows the problem inherent in the negative publicity.
Al-Anon meetings, geared toward helping alcoholics avoid the temptations of
alcohol, may ameliorate this patient's symptoms but will not treat the patient's
depression. Here, the author has had the hope of treatment taken away and
believes that there are few options available for dealing with the problems s/be
faces (I have limited medical coverage). The expense of choosing to go without
treatment, however, will be either continuing to live a life of diminished quality
blunted by depression or ultimately becoming one of the ten percent or more of
depressed patients who commit suicide. See infra, note 149.
89 Deborah Shelton Pinkney, Prozac's Pros and Cons: Suicide Experts De-
bate
Merits of the Most Prescribed Antidepressant, AM. MED. NEWS 18, Apr.
27, 1992, available in WESTLAW, 1992 WL 11291950 (quoting a psychiatrist
who said that several of his patients who
were doing well on Prozac discontinued it after the negative publicity, then
later attempted suicide).
90 Jan Gehorsham, Health Watch: Prozac Maker Oers to Pay Legal Costs
for Doctors Sued, ATLANTA J. & CONST., June 6, 1991, available in WEST-
LAW, 1991 WL 7796602.
91 Thomas M. Burton, Medicine.' Scientologists Fail to Persuade FDA on
Prozac, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 1991, available in WESTLAW, 1991 WL-WSJ
597423.
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25Psychopharmacological Drugs Advisory Committee in September 1991, to inves-
tigate further the claims made against Prozac in particular and antidepressants
in general. Following a public hearing and consideration of scientic evidence
on September 20, 1991, the Committee recommended remaining on the course
the FDA had been following: there should be no label changes for Prozac and
there was no evidence of a link between Prozac and violent behavior.92 The
FDA had received 14,100 reports of adverse reactions occurring in connection
with Prozac since the drug's approval in l987.~~ The FDA continued to defend
Prozac, though, arguing that the drug's benets outweighed its possible risks,
because there were only 500 reports of suicide attempts associated with Prozac
use while three million Americans had been given or were taking Prozac.94 Ab-
sent conclusive scientic data of a causal link between Prozac and violence,
the FDA maintained that the drug should be considered safe.95 Despite such
assurances, however, Prozac was clearly suering from public disapproval, as
Prozac's market share eroded because of the negative publicity.96 Thus, not
only were patients suering from a lack of treatment, but Lilly was also expend-
ing substantial amounts to indemniFy physicians and fund prosecutions, while
the FDA was wasting resources on public hearings that coarmed its judgment.
92 Panel.' Data Fail to Link Prozac, Suicidal Actions, Associated Press,
ARIz.
REPUBLIC/PHOENIX GAZETrEA3, Sept. 21, 1991, available in WEST-
LAW, 1991 WL 6035394. See also, Committee Advises FDA on Antidepressants,
25 FDA CONSUMER 5, (Dec. 1991), available in LExIS, News Library, Arcnws
le.
Id
Committee Advises FDA on Antidepressants, supra note 92.
Id
96 Supra, note 86. See also, Ken Kusmer, FDA Approves New Form of
Drug, The Associated Press, Apr. 25, 1991, available in WESTLAW, 1991 WL
6183244.
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26B. Prozac's Rehabilitation
In early 1993, Prozac began to reclaim the public's approval with the help
of Dr. Peter Kramer, an associate clinical professor of psychiatry at Brown
University and private practitioner in Providence, who published Listening to
Prozac.' A Psychiatrist Explores Antidepressant Drugs and the Remaking of
the Self The book chronicled Dr. Kramer's experience prescribing Prozac to his
patients. Dr. Kramer's description of Prozac and of its capacity to make his
patients appear to be better than well97 sparked new interest in Prozac because
of its capacity to improve the personality of the person taking it. Describing this
phenomenon, Dr. Kramer wrote that Prozac appeared to [give] social condence
to the habitually timid, [make] the sensitive brash, [lend] the introvert the social
skills of a salesman. Prozac was transformative for patients in the way an
inspirational minister or high-pressure group therapy can be....98 The book spent
three months on the New York Times bestseller list and the public's condence
in the drug rebounded99 As proof of its rehabilitated reputation, Prozac posted
a 30% increase in sales between 1992 and
1993.'~
Peter D. Kramer, LISTENING TO PROZAC: A PSYCHIATRIST EX-
PLORES ANTIDEPRESSANT DRUGS AND THE REMAKING OF THE
SELF at x (1993).
98 Id at xv.
Anastasia Toufexis, The Personality Pill (Prozac), TiME, Oct. 11, 1993,
available in WESTLAW, 1993 WL 2929609. Without directly tying the in-
creased use of Prozac to the publication of Dr. Kramer's book, the article did
report that there were a growing number of people using Prozac and that the
drug appeared to be making a comeback. Another reporter described the book
as another makeover for the drug, increasing its popularity among Americans.
Susan Brink, Singing the Prozac Blues, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 8,
1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws le.
100 Michael W. Miller, Listening to Eli Lilly: Prozac Hysteria Has Gone Too
Far,
(continued...)
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27In spite of this apparent new success in the public forum, other problems con-
tinued to mount for the Prozac. The Church had not abandoned its campaign
against Lilly and Prozac. The head of the CCHR published an editorial in
August 1994, reviewing FDA documents obtained through the Freedom of In-
formation Act (FOIA) and pointing out aws in the studies peormed by Lilly
in support of its application for FDA approvat'01 CCHR also continued to drive
up the costs associated with the negative publicity by ling a defamation suit
against a Lilly executive'02 and by continuing to provide assistance to products
liability plainti~ and to criminal defendants.
Moreover, evidence was beginning to mount that the drug caused some seri-
ous side eects and interactions for a signicant number of patients using Prozac.
For example, contrary to the original marketing information, as many as 34%
of those taking Prozac experienced sexual dysfunction.'03 Others experienced
personality changes while taking Prozac,' and physicians
100( . . continued)
WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 1994, available in WESTLAW, 1994 WL-WSJ
298534.
101 Richard Warner, Dangers of Miracle Cure Should be Heeded, SEATrLE
POSTINTELLIGENCER, Aug. 9, 1994, available in WESTLAW, 1994 WL
612 0737. Warner revealed information contained in FDA documents that had
limited the FDA judgments about safety and ecacy, including a warning that
Prozac' s side eect prole might worsen patients' depression and a note on the
review of clinical data that leads to the conclusion that the true adverse eects
of Prozac were not known at the time of marketing. See infra, notes 130-174
and accompanying text (analyzing the FDA approval process for Prozac). That
analysis will show that Warner's information was correct.
102 Business Ledger, NEWSDAY 41, Feb. 5, 1992, available
in WESTLAW, 1992 WL
77237 15 (reporting that the Church led a $20 million suit against Mitchell
Daniels, a senior executive of Eli Lilly & Co.,... [alleging that] 'Daniels at-
tempted to discredit and malign the church as a source of the protest against
Prozac by making false and defamatory statements' about the church).
103 Frederick M. Jacobsen, Fluoxetine-Induced Sexual Dysfunction and an
Open Trial of Yohimbine, 53 J. CLIN. PSYCHIATRY 119 (1992). The original
marketing information
(continued...)
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28were becoming increasingly aware of dangerous interactions with other drugs.'05
Most of these eects had been under-reported or overlooked when the drug was
rst marketed.'~
One serious side eect that began to be reported was the serotonin syndrome.
Though known to occur in some patients using antidepressants, the serotonin
syndrome was becoming more common as the use of SSRls was becoming more
widespread.'07 Serotonin syndrome is a toxic reaction that produces a cluster
of serious conditions, including (1) altered mental status, which is reected
in symptoms such as confusion, mania and agitation, (2) autonomic dysfunc-
tion, which is reected in symptoms such as blood pressure uctuation, diar-
rhea, hyperthermia and shivering, and (3) neuromuscular abnormalities, whose
symptoms include restlessness, incoordination, rigidity, seizures and tremor.'08
Though experts do not completely understand its cause, it is generally believed
that the buildup of serotonin in the system, which develops as the
103( ..continued)
found that only 1.9% of clinical test subjects using uoxetine suered from
sexual dysfunction while using the drug. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRA-
TION, SUMMARY BASIS OF APPROVAL FOR NDA, 18-936, Prozac (Flu-
oxetine Hydrochloride) 35 (Oct. 3, 1988) [hereinafter, SBA]. The problem with
this information is that sexual dysfunction can lead to noncompliance with drug
therapy. Id at 119. This makes treating the patient's depression much more
dicult, unless the physician is aware of the possibility that this adverse eect
will occur and can help the patient cope with the diculty. Physicians would
not necessarily focus on Prozac use as a source of sexual dysfunction when the
marketing information estimated its incidence at such a low rate.
This was rst documented in Kramer, supra note 97 (describing many of his
patients who underwent personality changes after beginning to use Prozac).
105 Brink, supra note 99. See, e.g., infra, note 110 and accompanying text.
106 Id See also, Jacobsen, supra note 103, at 119.
107 Thomas G. Martin, Serotonin Syndrome, 28 ANNALS
OF EMERGENCY MED. 520,
524 (1996).
108 Id at 52 1-22.
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29SSRI prevents the depletion of serotonin in the brain cells, becomes excessive
and causes some or all of these conditions to develop in patients who already
have sucient serotonin in their brains.'09 The reaction can often be managed
by discontinuing the use of the drug, but it can result in death, particularly
when the use of an SSRI occurs in conjunction with the patient's taking other
medications.0
The specter of suicide and violence had also not disappeared. In Texas,
consumer advocates began to seek state remedies to require the labeling infor-
mation that the FDA would not authorize.' In the United Kingdom (UK), a
review of Prozac and other SSRIs was being published, which tended to show an
indirect link between SSRIs and suicide. The physician serving as the secretary
of the British Association for Psychopharmacology concluded that 'There is now
sucient documentation to sustain the argument that Prozac may lead to the
emergence of suicidal ideation,2 and the common adverse eects attributed to
Prozac, such as agitation,
~ Id
110 Id at 520-21.
Mark Smith, Prozac Targeted by Health Group/Warning Label Called For,
HOUS. CHRON., Jan. 1, 1994, available in WESTLAW, 1994 WL 4592054
(reporting that the Texas Mental Health Consumers had petitioned the Texas
Department of Health to require pharmacists to place labels on Prozac bottles
warning of the possibility that Prozac could cause patients to become suicidal
and aggressive, because patients did not receive adequate warning about the
adverse eects associated with Prozac from either their physicians or the pre-
scription bottle itself). By petitioning to require pharmacists to attach labels
to bottles used in dispensing the prescription, the group would skirt the issue
of federal pre-emption over prescription drug labeling, because the practice of
pharmacy is regulated by state law.
112 Christine Doyle, The Cloud over Bottled Sunshine, DAiLY TELEGRAPH
(London), Mar. 1, 1994, available in WESTLAW, 1994 WL 11340497 (quot-
ing an article that would be published later in the year) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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30nervousness, restlessness and panic, might foster bizarre thinking in predisposed
people.3 Because physicians relied heavily on the FDA's judgment that Prozac
was safe and
eective, two trends had developed in the prescribing of Prozac: (1) in-
creasing numbers of patients were using the drug, even though many of them
did not meet the diagnostic criteria for depression, and (2) physicians began to
leave their patients on Prozac indenitely. Misdiagnosis appeared to be the pri-
mary reason for the increase in the use of Prozac, a phenomenon that developed
because of the increase in the number of nonspecialists prescribing Prozac.5
Moreover, with Prozac's more favorable side eect prole, physicians were more
comfortable leaving their patients on Prozac indenitely,6 ignoring the fact that
Prozac's long-term risks were unknown because of the lack of long-term testing.
These trends were problematic because of the developing evidence on side ef-
fects, primarily the potentially fatal serotonin syndrome. By prescribing Prozac
to patients who really did not need it and by leaving patients on the drug in-
denitely, physicians exposed their patients to the risk that their brains would
build up too much serotonin and they would, essentially, overdose on serotonin.
Also, studies began to show that Prozac carried with it the same failure
Id (internal quotation marks omitted).
' Natalie Angier, Doubts Over the New Antidepressants, ATLANTA J. &
CoNST., Dec. 27, 1993, available in WESTLAW, 1993 WL 4018418.
~ Brink, supra note 99. The article cited a study that found that 63%
of prescriptions for antidepressants were made by a nonspecialist, and more
than half of those prescribing physicians spent three minutes or less with the
depressed patient discussing the disorder. Nonspecialists in this situation fail
to determine if all the symptoms that should be present before drug therapy is
started are present for the patient about to receive the prescription.
116 Angier, supra note 114.
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31rate as the older antidepressants, meaning that it was not the miracle cure
that it had originally been reported to be;7 thus, without proper diagnosis and
treatment, patients actually experiencing depression continued to suer. As
a result, consumers would continue to provide mixed signals regarding their
acceptance of Pro zac, because there now were legitimate dangers associated
with it. In promoting these trends, physicians ignored the eect that the public
has on the approval and marketing process and helped to increase the costs
associated with the controversy.
Lilly's response to all the new information was mixed. On the one hand, Lilly
defended Prozac against the data collected on sexual dysmction, saying that
sex diculties will almost always be under-reported in clinical trials; challenged
accounts such as Dr. Kramer's, saying that personality changes naturally result
from depression and the eect is not unusual; and, defended itself against the
charge that it had failed to detect some drug interactions, arguing that no
company can test all the possible drug interactions that are dangerous.'18 Much
of this is true, because clinical trials cannot possibly uncover all the information
about the adverse eects associated with a new drug.9 Prozac's success had
made it protable enough to pursue FDA approval for labeling the drug as
a treatment for other illnesses, and eventually Lilly would receive approval to
market the drug as safe and eective not only for the treatment of depression
but also
~ Angier, supra note 114.
118 Brink, supra note 99.
~ See infra, note 226 and accompanying text. It also seems likely that any
study of a drug will tend to underestimate the incidence of sexual dysfunction
because of the delicacy of exploring the issue with clinical test subjects.
30
32for the treatment of obsessive-compulsive disorder.'20
On the other hand, Lilly appeared to be rethinking its strategy with Prozac,
launching an advertising campaign that appeared to discourage the use of Prozac.
The advertising campaign had as its goal to deplore the media's role in exagger-
ating the drug's power and making light of depression.'2' The Wall Street Jour-
nal characterized the motivation behind this unusual strategy as being born of
concern that Prozac's over-use was trivializing mental illness, discouraging those
truly depressed from seeking treatment and making it dicult to have mental
health treatment included in the national health plan being considered at that
time.'22 Lilly's motivation could also have stemmed from a desire to limit its
exposure to potential liability and to improve its image, which the controversy
had severely damaged. While it would be dicult if not impossible to verif~'
empirically that in fact the nation was beginning to trivialize the issue of mental
illness, and regardless of Lilly's true motives, Lilly raised a good point. If the
over-use of Prozac could lead to the under-treatment of mental illness, then the
social costs would be enormous'23 and Prozac
120 See PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE 935, 936 (51st ed. 1997). Once
a drug has been approved for marketing, the sponsor may only market the drug
for the indication listed on the original NDA. To market the same drug for
use in treating other illnesses, the sponsor must obtain an approval from the
FDA, indicating that the drug is safe and eective for the treatment of the
other condition or conditions. See Walsh and Pyrich, supra note 1, at 943-
45 (outlining the process for obtaining approval for a supplemental indication
and concluding that because of the cost in both time and money involved,
manuThcturers are reluctant to submit [applications for supplemental approval]
for their products).
121 Miller, supra note 100.
122 Id
123 The costs of depression are dicult to estimate but are clearly quite
high. The social cost of depression may be as high as $40 billion annually in
lost productivity, lost income, and health-care costs. David B. Cohen, OUT OF
THE BLUE: DEPRESSION AND HUMAN NATURE
(continued...)
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33would not be serving the purpose it was intended to serve, namely to provide a
safer means of treating patients with a devastating illness.'2
Although the intensity of the controversy has now subsided, the public's
perception of Prozac is mixed. While many products liability plainti complain
that Prozac is unsafe and is responsible for causing severe adverse eects in
certain users,'25 the use ofProzac and the related SSRIs continues to rise. In
March 1996, Lilly's sales of Prozac began to slow down, with Lilly posting
only a six percent increase in new prescriptions,'26 and Prozac has struggled to
maintain its market share against the newer SSRIs coming onto the market.'27
Prozac has continued to do well, though, with its dollar sales up 14% at the end
of 1996 to $2.3 billion.'28
This history compels the conclusion that the controversy over Prozac's safety
drained the
123(. continued)
52 (1994). The personal cost for the depressed individual and his or her
family would be dicult to measure, though an important indicator is the more
than 15 percent of depressed people who commit suicide and the more who
come close. Id at 51. For a moving account of the personal and social costs of
depression, see id at 50-2.
124 See infra, notes 133-136 and accompanying text (reviewing the data
showing Prozac to have certain safety advantages).
125 Plaintis continue to pursue products liability lawsuits against Lilly. See,
e.g., Winider et al. V. Eli Lilly and Company, 101 F.3d 1196 (1996) (noting
that seventy-ve Prozac cases have been consolidated by the Federal Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation into a class action suit against Lilly). Cur-
rently, though, no judgments have been entered against Lilly and the litigation
continues to make its way through procedural issues.
126 Trade & Gov't Memos, F-D-C REP. ('The Pink Sheet), May 27, 1996,
available in LEXIS, Health Library, FDC le.
127 Trade & Gov't Memos, F-D-C REP. ('The Pink Sheet), Jan. 13, 1997,
available in LExIS, Health Library, FDC le.
128 Id
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34public coers and imposed a huge tax, nancially and socially, on society, be-
cause the regulatory process for drug approval did not account for the fact that
the public would operate its own process as a check on the FDA. Products li-
ability suits placed an additional tax on the company who, in good faith, had
already expended vast resources to provide a drug to the public that the public,
through its political process, had judged to be benecial in the treatment of de-
pression. The politically accountable agency charged with making the public's
decisions expended additional resources against the challenge to its expertise
and to its considered judgment that the drug would be benecial, and physi-
cians were taxed with malpractice suits for relying on this agency's ndings.
The greatest cost came in the losses sustained as patients in need of treatment
did not receive, either because of their fear of the drug induced by negative
hype or because hysteria had trivialized their illness, a safe medication that
could be eective for them.'29 Any eort, then, to reform the drug approval
process must consider these eects on the public, the FDA, drug manufactur-
ers, and the healthcare professionals who rely on the FDA's judgment, because
streamlining approval has the potential to create similar controversies that, if
not more severe than that associated with Prozac, may become more frequent
and are likely to be just as costly.
C. The Drug Approval Process for Prozac
Reviewing the process that Prozac underwent to obtain FDA approval for
marketing shows that the process was decient in several respects. There was
actually a low threshold for proving ecacy, some of the tests conducted were
unnecessary, and little was really understood
129 See supra, note 123 (estimating the costs of depression at $40 billion
annually).
33
35about the eects associated with uoxetine use at the time the drug went on the
market.'30 As a summary matter, the SBA indicates that the studies conducted
on uoxetine were
sucient to meet the statutory requirements of demonstrating that the drug
was both safe and eective in the treatment of depression, though safety and
eectiveness of use for longer than six weeks was not established.'3' The initial
recommended dose was 20mg, with dose increases recommended after several
weeks of no improvement.'32
1. Establishing Safety
Both preclinical and clinical testing established that uoxetine administra-
tion had no immediate safety problems; however, this conclusion about uox-
etine's safety was limited, for there were no conclusive data on the safety of
long-term use nor was there a denitive conclusion about the eect that uox-
etine's unique cluster of adverse eects (side eect proe) would have on the
overall safety of the drug for large populations ofpatients. Preclinical animal
testing was used in allowing the FDA to conclude that uoxetine's major ben-
et compelling approval of the drug was its safety in high doses, making it very
dicult for patients using uoxetine to
130 After approving a new drug, the FDA issues a Summary Basis of Ap-
proval (SBA), which provides a review of the documentation supporting the
drug's approval This section examines the SBA for uoxetine, and is limited by
the data contained therein.
SBA, supra note 103, at I.
132 SBA, supra note 103, at 2. The SBA notes that therapy for depression
can require treatment for longer than four weeks, as acute episodes of depression
normally respond only after several months of treatment. Id Antidepressant
treatment for months-long periods of time is generally accepted as a standard
treatment regimen for depression. See Pedro L. Delgado and Alan J. Gelenberg,
Decision Making in the Use of Antidepressants.' Treatment Considerations,
in THE HATHERLEIGH GUIDE TO MANAGING DEPRESSION 265 (Joya
Lonsdale, ed. 1996). At the end of three to four weeks, antidepressants will
usually have had some eect on the patient, but the patient will generally not
experience the ll therapeutic eect of an antidepressant until week twelve of
the drug therapy. Id at 273.
34
36commit suicide.'33 Most of the animals tested showed that high doses of uox-
etine produced convulsions and tests on dogs revealed a moderately decreased
heart rate.'3 Studies on cats showed that there were no cardiovascular eects
associated with uoxetine use, such as blood pressure changes, cardiac con-
tractility or cardiac conduction.'35 These data were particularly relevant to the
conclusion that uoxetine overdose was unlikely to lead to death.'36 Finally,
preclinical testing established the potential for a dangerous interaction with
MAO-inhibitors.'37
The clinical data supported the conclusions about the safety of uoxetine,
particularly the safety of uoxetine in overdose, and, contrary to the public
judgment that uoxetine was dangerous, the FDA found no clear evidence for
any clinically signicant safety risk associated with the use of uoxetine.'38
Phase I clinical studies showed no safety problems with
'~' Richard Kapit, Safety Review of NDA 18-936, SBA, supra note 103, at
2 (concluding that uoxetine does not appear to cause serious toxicity.. . . If
signicant amelioration of depression is a demonstable [sic] eect of this drug,
this benet would appear to outweigh any potential risks associated with its
clinical use which became evident among patients exposed to uoxetine reported
in this NDA). See infra, note 149 (explaining the importance of this nding of
safety in overdose as it relates to depressed patients).
i SBA, supra note 103, at 17.
~ Id at 5-6.
136 Rosenbaum, supra note 60, at 10.
'i' SBA, supra note 103, at 16. MAO-inhibitors are antidepressants that are
frequently associated with dangerous interactions with certain foods and medi-
cations. Steven Zavodnick, Somatic Therapies of Depression, in DEPRESSIVE
DISORDERS: FACTS, THEORIES AND TREATMIENT METHODS 275, 28
1-84 (Benjamin B. Wolman and George Stricker eds., 1990). The list of sub-
stances to avoid ranges from alcohol, cheese, certain meats, and beans to cold
and allergy medicines, appetite suppressants, and other antidepressants. Id at
284. Thus, a determination of possible interaction with MAO-inhibitors was
critical to the nding of safety.
138 ~(~pit supra note 133, at 12.
35
37uoxetine.'39 Furthermore, the sponsor pooled and evaluated the safety data'0
from all clinical trials, from which the FDA concluded that there were no clin-
ically signicant changes in hematology, chemistry or urinalysis parameters,
blood pressure or heart rate changes, or liver functions associated with uoxe-
tine use." The drug was associated with decreased weight, but that side eect
was determined not to be suciently dangerous.'2 At most, there were some
changes in blood hemoglobin and LDH levels that could be dangerous if not
monitored carefully.'3
Although both preclinical and clinical data established the nding of safety
in overdose' and the safety of use in short-term situations, there were very
little data on the long-term use of uoxetine, which made it impossible to draw
conclusions about the drug's safety during long-term use.'5 The data on adverse
eects associated with uoxetine use was reviewed by combining
'~ Kapit, supra note 133, at 7. Only one Phase I test subject had a serious
eect { a ~'mild seizure { while on uoxetine, but no conclusions were drawn
from this report. Id
140 The pooled population of uoxetine-exposed test subjects had 6,070 pa-
tients. See SBA, supra note 103, at 27.
SBA, supra note 103, at 32.
142 Kapit, supra note 133, at 12.
143 Id at 11-12.
' While 38 clinical test subjects attempted overdoses with uoxetine, only
two overdoses resulted in death, and those patients had combined extremely
high doses of uoxetine (1,800mg and 3,000mg) with other drugs at the time of
overdose. SBA, supra note 103, at 38. The other 36 patients recovered without
any lasting eects. Id
's The FDA acknowledges that an approval process that focuses on pre-
market testing and proof will always be limited in the data that can be col-
lected. Thus, it is never the case that a drug has received a thorough review
of the long-term eects associated with continuous use. See infra, note 226 and
accompanying text.
36
38clinical data on 1,427 patients who received uoxetine. Of these patients, only
211 had received uoxetine for more than 183 days and only 74 of the 211 had
received uoxetine for more than 365 days.6
These limited ndings present problems, because at the time of this testing,
experts generally believed that antidepressant therapy required treatment for
several months.'7 Thus, the safety data was not sucient to determine that
administering uoxetine to human patients would be safe under the conditions
that most patients would use the drug, as the serotonin syndrome showed.'8 The
time required to conduct the necessary tests, however, would delay the drug's
entry onto the market, thereby depriving physicians and patients of a treatment
that had signicant safety advantages over drug treatments then available. Be-
cause physicians could prescribe uoxetine to their depressed patients without
fear that the drug would accomplish a suicide attempt, as was true with older
antidepressants, delaying the availability of uoxetine could compromise the
safety of patients already receiving antidepressant drug therapy.'9
146 Review and Evaluation of Clinical Data: Original NDA Submission,
SBA, supra note 103, at 121 [hereinafter Original NDA Submission]. Of the
6,070 test subjects in the pooled safety sample, only six percent of the popula-
tion had received the drug for more than one year.
'~ See, e.g., SBA, supra note 103, at 2 (The full antidepressant eect may
be delayed until 4 weeks of treatment or longer... . It is generally agreed among
expert psychopharmacologists (circa 1987) that acute episodes of depression
require several months or longer of sustained pharmacologic therapy). See also,
supra, note 132.
'~ Supra, notes 107-110 and accompanying text.
The potential for suicide in depressed patients is great: as many as ten
percent of patients with major depressive disorder will succeed in committing
suicide unless they are treated eectively. Alan A. Stone, Psychiatry and the
Law Classroom Presentation at Harvard Law School, January 21, 1997. See
also Cohen, supra note 123, at 51(1994) (placing the percentage of depressed
patients who commit suicide at more than 15%). Thus, any medication that
will
(continued...)
37
39Moreover, the conclusion of uoxetine's safety was tainted by the procedure
used to determine the adverse eects associated with uoxetine use. Because
Lilly had given no indication of the methods used to collect the data on adverse
eects, the clinical data review concluded that there was no systematic proce-
dure in place and that the reporting of adverse eects was left to the discretion
of the clinical investigators; in addition, Lilly instructed investigators not to in-
clude experiences caused by depression.150 The lack of a systematic procedure,
combined with the specic instruction not to note depressive symptoms,
may have altered the relative frequencies of many adverse experiences. Each
investigator would have had his own idea of what depressive experiences might
comprise resulting in a lack of generalizeability [sic] from one investigator to the
next. Not surprisingly, many antidepressants (and anxiolytic) agents do produce
adverse eects whi~~h are known to be symptoms of depressions, (e.g., mso-
minia [sic], nausea, anxiety, tension, restlessness) leading to a possible under-
representation of these eects.'5'
Thus, any information on adverse experiences provided postmarketing was,
at best, incomplete and, at worst, irrelevant or misleading. Though the FDA
obviously concluded that the
149( .. continued)
result in death if used in a suicide attempt poses serious ethical problems for
the prescriber. The considerations given to safety in reviewing uoxetine were
therefore not irrational, and it could be justiable for the FDA to conclude that
this signicant advantage outweighed the risks of having incomplete long-term
data. However, there are no data that establish how often the older antidepres-
sants were used to attempt suicide, making it unclear whether this advantage of
uoxetine outweighed the risk of rushing the drug to market based on clinical
test data derived from trials of inadequate duration.
150 Original NDA Submission, supra note 146, at 122. Besides spontaneous
reporting, Lilly could have instructed researchers to conduct systematic inter-
views designed to elicit adverse eect reports. Instead, Lilly instructed investi-
gators to record all patient experiences on the drug and to make a determination
as to the causation of the experience. Lilly provided no parameters or criteria
for making that determination. Id
'~' Id
38
40information was sucient to allow a basic understanding of the adverse eects
associated with uoxetine use, the FDA should have required Lilly to complete
and correct this information upon marketing so that physicians and patients
would have more accurate information. The FDA's statutory responsibility af-
ter approval extends only to removing drugs that are found to be an imminent
hazard,'52 and the FDA has consistently interpreted the authority to withdraw
hazardous drugs from the market as giving it the authority to conduct post-
marketing surveillance of drugs. Thus, if the FDA will incur this responsibility,
then the FDA also has the responsibility to ensure that information on adverse
eects is as complete as possible.
With such skewed information on the adverse eects associated with uox-
etine, there was no clear indication of what the adverse eects of uoxetine use
were likely to be. Considered with the advantage of hindsight, this aspect of
the approval process is troubling. Clinical investigators, confronted with pa-
tients reporting symptoms such as those reported in the media after marketing
(including worsening depressive symptoms and suicidal ideation),'53 would have
been justied in leaving out this information from their reports on the basis of
the instructions Lilly provided. Thus, Lilly's assertions during the controversy
that suicidal ideation and other violent tendencies were not adverse eects of
uoxetine use were misleading, for in fact there was no good evidence either in
support of or opposed to this assertion.
Moreover, there was apparently never any attempt to make a precise deter-
mination of the eect that uoxetine' s new side eect prole would have on the
patients taking it. The limited
152 21 U.S.C.A. x 355(c) (West Supp. 1973-1995). See also, supra part l1.C.
(discussing postmarketing regulation by the FDA).
'~' See supra, part [II.
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41data on adverse eects had established that uoxetine use was associated with a
signicantly dierent cluster of side eects from older antidepressants, which had
the potential to make depressed patients worse. Unlike older antidepressants,
which had a very dierent side eect prole, uoxetine tended to produce side
eects that are often associated with depression, such as nausea, insomnia,
nervousness, anorexia and weight loss.'5 All of the clinical studies revealed that
these symptoms were the most frequently reported of the side eects, and the
review of the safety data concluded that 'These adverse eects of uoxetine
treatment may negatively aect patients with depression. .. . It is possible that
uoxetine treatment might, at least temporarily, make their illness worse.'55 At
the time of the safety review, it was unclear how great a risk this new side eect
prole would be. Dr. Kapit concluded that the severity of the risk did not
appear
156 noneth
great, yet he eless recommended that the labeling note the lack of experience
with this type of prole in treating depressed patients and that postmarketing
studies be conducted to
determine the severity of the risk. The SBA reports, however, only that Lilly
agreed to conduct postmarketing studies in order to provide two additional
ecacy studies and to assist in developing more precise directions for using
uoxetine. ~
Thus, the data collected on safety were clearly decient in several respects.
First, Lilly had not provided and the FDA had not received substantial evidence
that the drug was safe for long-term use. While collecting the long-term data
would be dillicult without lengthening overall
's Kapit, supra note 133, at 11.
'~ Id at 15.
156 Id
~ SBA, supra note 103, at 47.
40
42drug development time, this aspect of the safety data is troubling because most
patients would use the drug for longer than four to six weeks. Second, Lilly
could not tell what the adverse eects of uoxetine use would be and the FDA
made no eort to require that information. This failure was an abdication
of the FDA's responsibility. Finally, neither Lilly nor the FDA attempted to
determine the eects uoxetine's side eects would have on depressed patients.
Patients taking Prozac were thus at risk of becoming more depressed while not
necessarily being aware that their treatment was the cause.
2. Establishing Ecacy
The data establishing ecacy also was decient, relying on marginal nd-
ings of ecacy and requiring unnecessaly tests. Though the FDA concluded
that Lilly had provided three adequate and well-controlled studies sucient to
establish uoxetine's ecacy for depression, the threshold of proof was low, es-
tablishing, at best, only a reasonable indication that uoxetine was eective.
Of the studies used to establish ecacy, the FDA concluded that one (Proto-
col 62) was awed and the other two (Protocols 19 and 27) were limited in
the results that were found. In the only convincing study of ecacy, Protocol
27, a six week test of uoxetine, placebo and imipramine,158 found that uox-
etine was more eective than placebo but not necessarily more eective than
imipramine.'59 In Protocol 19, a ve week comparison of uoxetine and placebo,
only a small group of patients completed the study, making its results dicult
to interpret. Eleven patients on uoxetine completed the study and thirteen
patients receiving the placebo completed the study. To make a determination
about the ecacy of uoxetine, all patients who had received
158 Imipramine is a tricycic antidepressant.
~ SBA, supra note 103, at 23.
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43at least a baseline measure of depression and one rating of depression while
on the treatment were compared. While the FDA concluded that uoxetine
patients improved more than patients on placebo,'60 this nding was limited
to three of the six variables used to measure ecacy.16' In Protocol 62, a six
week comparison of xed doses of uoxetine'62 and placebo showed that only
the 20mg dose appeared to be eective. In reviewing Protocol 62, however,
the reviewer noted that the data from this study could not be conclusively said
to establish the eectiveness of a particular dose.'63 Another reviewer agreed
that the data were hard to interpret but that their positive ndings did provide
evidence of antidepressant ecacy.' That conclusion, however, did not account
for all the other ndings that showed uoxetine to be no dierent than placebo
or other active drugs.
160 Id at 20.
161 Original NDA Submission, supra note 146, at 59. Scores on six tests of
depression were charted each week for patients in the clinical trials. The
tests measured the severity of the patient's depression and improvement in the
scores from week to week indicated therapeutic eect.
162 The doses were xed at 20mg, 40mg, and 60mg.
163 J~ Hillary Lee, Review and Evaluation of Clinical Data: Clinical Data
Amendment, SBA, supra note 103, at 12. The data suggested that 20mg doses
of uoxetine were ecacious, while the higher doses, particularly the 60mg dose,
were not. The design of the study was awed because those patients assigned
to the 60mg group had not been titrated to that dose; that is, they had not
gradually been brought up to that dose. (Titration is a standard procedure
that allows the body to adjust gradually to a high dose and thus minimizes
adverse experiences.) As a result of the lack of titration, more 60mg patients
dropped out of the study earlier because of uncomfortable adverse eects, yet
the data for these patients was compared with the data of patients completing
the entire six week study. That comparison confounded the statistical analyses
of the data and the reviewer concluded that this confounding meant that it may
not be appropriate to conclude that low doses are better than high. Id
' Thomas P. Laughren, Handwritten Note, attached to Lee, supra note 163,
at 13.
42
44The clinical data on ecacy had several shortcomings. First, the review of the
clinical data noted that the placebo-controlled studies, those studies comparing
uoxetine with an inert pill, were greatly aected by dropouts. Those who were
doing poorly during the rst few weeks of the clinical trials could be dropped
from the study and a determination made as to the drug they were taking. The
review concluded that this could have aected the placebo-controlled studies
because breaking a double-blind study can inuence the investigator's behavior
and the ability to break the double-blind may have acted as an incentive to drop
patients earlier than they might otherwise have been dropped.'65 This, however,
will always be a problem with placebo-controlled studies.'66 Physicians would
have a strong disincentive to participate in clinical trials if they could not make
a determination that a patient was responding poorly enough to merit breaking
the double-blind design. Also, the patient samples were cleaned up to include
only those patients with a less severe form of depression, who had the ability to
communicate adequately with the
165 Original NDA Submission, supra note 146, at 68.
166 Some have debated the ethics of using placebos in clinical trials because
their use deprives suering patients from treatment that could be eective.
Kenneth J. Rothman and Karin
B. Michels, The Continuing Unethical Use of Placebo Controls, 331
NEw ENG. J. MED. 394 (1994). These authors argue that the Declaration
of Helsinki, a code of conduct for human experimentation in medical studies,
proscribes the use of a placebo as control when a 'proven' therapeutic method
exists. Id at 394. They would have the FDA eectively prohibit the unethi-
cal use of placebos in drug trials by requiring a persuasive ethical justication
whenever placebos are used. Id at 397. Otherwise, the drug company would
have to use standard drug treatments as controls in clinical trials. Had this
been the case with uoxetine, there would not have been two adequate and
well- (that is, standard drug-) controlled studies that could have supported ap-
proval. See Lee, supra note 163, at 79-102 (reviewing the active drug controlled
studies and determining that Protocols 20 and 23 { the only two studies that
showed uoxetine to be superior to the active control drug { suered from aws
in design).
43
45investigators, and who were not taking other medications.'67
The animal studies conducted to establish the therapeutic potential of u-
oxetine were unconvincing and, unlike the animal studies used to demonstrate
uoxetine's safety,168 not useful. In the only reference to preclinical evaluations
of potential ecacy, uoxetine was shown to [antagonize] reserpine-induced hy-
pothermia in mice.'69 Reserpine-induced depression, however, has limited value
as a model for human depression, because it does not necessarily reect the eti-
ology or course of naturally-induced depression in humans.'70 At best, then, the
studies showing that uoxetine did act on this condition hinted at the possibil-
ity that uoxetine might be useful in treating some forms of human depression,
but only a form of depression that a small subset of depressed patients would
develop. More likely the testing was superuous; the information gathered was
helpful rather than necessary or compelling, serving primarily to drive up the
cost of uoxetine's development.
167 This limitation is inherent in clinical trials. See infra, note 226 and
accompanying text.
168 See supra, notes 133-136 and accompanying text.
169 SBA, supra note 103, at 5. Reserpine is a drug used to treat high
blood pressure that has been found to induce depressive symptoms in humans
and animals alike. By administering reserpine to animals, thereby inducing a
chemical depression in the animals, researchers could then determine whether
or not uoxetine would act to combat the depressive symptoms. See R Francis
Schlemmer, Jr. et at, Pharmacological Probes in Primate Social Behavior, in
ANIMAL MODELS OF DEPRESSION 239, 239-40 (George F. Koob et at
eds., 1989). The link between alleviation of reserpine-induced depression and
the administration of uoxetine was apparently sucient to meet the regulatory
requirement that animal studies show some evidence of ecacy before an [NI)
is approved.
170 See Gaylord D. Ellison, Animal Models of Psychopathology: Studies in
Naturalistic Colony Environments, in PSYCHOPATHOLOGY IN ANIMALS:
RESEARCH AND CLINICAL IMPLICATIONS 81, 86-90 (J.D. Keehn ed.,
1979).
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46Of more value may have been predlinical testing that established that uoxetine
blocked the uptake of serotonin in the neuronal synapses and acted selectively
on serotonin.'7' Because serotonin is thought to be linked with depression, these
data should have suggested by inference that uoxetine had therapeutic poten-
tial. However, this information appears to have been used primarily to establish
the pharmacokinetics of uoxetine, for no such inference was drawn.
While the data on ecacy are underwhelming in the slight degree to which
they establish that uoxetine is eective as an antidepressant, Lilly had probably
met the statutory requirement of providing substantial evidence of ecacy.'72
In weighing the risks and benets of uoxetine, though, proof of ecacy prob-
ably played a smaller role in the risk-benet calculus than the proof of safety.
What tended to make uoxetine attractive and suciently benecial to war-
rant approval was its overwhelming evidence of safety under normal conditions
of use.'73 In leveling the charge against the FDA and Lilly that there was not
sucient evidence that the drug was eective,'7 what the publicity tended to
ignore or failed to understand was that a risk-benet analysis of the drug was
indeed favorable, justifying approval.
SBA, supra note 103, at 4. The availability of serotonin in the brain is
believed to be a critical component in treating depression. Two studies in the
late 1960s laid the foundation for believing there was a link between serotonin
and depression. Henry R Boume et at, Noradrenaline, 5-hydroxybyptamine and
5-hydroxyindoleace tic Acid in Hind-Brains of Suicidal Patients, 2 LANCET
805 (1968); Solomon H. Snyder and Joseph T. Coyle, Regional Diferences in
[3H]-norepinephrine and [3H]-dopamine Uptake into Rat Brain Homogenates,
165 J. PHARMACOLOGY AND EXP. THERAPEUTICS 78(1969).
172 See supra, note 33.
'~' See supra, notes 133-136 and accompanying text.
'v See, e.g., Warner, supra note 101.
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47IV. The Debate over Reform of the FDA
A. Background
Concern that the American public is being deprived of valuable drug treat-
ments because of drug lag'75 has focused the attention on reform. Noting this
drug lag, critics of the FDA argue that the 1962 Kefauver-Harris Amendments,
which required proof of both safety and ecacy prior to marketing, led to more
time-consuming and stringent testing requirements. Adhering to these require-
ments, set by a monolithic regulatory entity with too much authority and too
few incentives to act eciently, has caused the drug lag.'76
The catalyst in the debate on reform has been the AIDS crisis.' America's
experience with ALI)S has provided the moral imperative to reform the drug
approval process, because the process is seen as responsible for unconscionably
long periods of time in which these patients must suer without treatment. By
refusing to alter the process, critics argue that the FDA condemns AIDS victims
to death and allows them to suer needlessly while waiting for
' Drug lag has been dened as a gap in new drug introduction.. . between
the
United States and other sophisticated, drug-producing and consuming na-
tions. Rosemary Pierce
Wall, Note, International Trends in New Drug Approval Regulation: The
Impact on
Pharmaceutical Innovation, 10 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 317,
318(1984). The
frequent refrain is that other countries have access to benecial drug treat-
ments long before the
FDA approves those treatments for marketing in the US.
176 Id Although most critics have blamed drug lag on the FDA's rigorous
premarketing approval requirements, some argue that the problem stems from
forces other than regulation. See id. at 3 18-19.
'~ See Relihan, supra note I, at 231 ('The AIDS crisis has forced the United
States 'drug lag' into the public eye and has provoked a reexamination of drug
testing and approval policies); Walsh and Pyrich, supra note 1, at 949 ...... in
response to criticisms of delays in approving AIDS drugs, the issue of 'drug lag'
has begun to be addressed seriously by the FDA).
46
48treatments to be proved safe and eective.'78 AIDS activists have put extreme
pressure on the FDA to remedy the drug lag, whether by shortening the ap-
proval process to get treatments on the market faster or by allowing patients
to import drugs from countries that will sell them. In an uncommon pairing,
conservative organizations and a Republican Congress interested in decreasing
the government's intervention in the free market have joined these reformers
in their eorts. With new Congressional leadership in 1994, Congress placed
various statutory reforms on the table and began slashing FDA funds,'79 while
conservative think-tanks poured their resources into advocating for reform.'80
The FDA is not without its supporters, however, who believe that the FDA
is a necessary regulatory agency with a justiably strict paternalistic philosophy
that saves lives.'8' They advocate maintaining the present system on the grounds
that the drug industry's disincentive to provide accurate information about
their products creates the need for strict governmental regulation. '~ Moreover,
the system's focus on stringent scientic standards of proof is the only way
to determine whether or not a drug is safe and eective and, absent such a
determination, the
178 Relihan, supra note 1, at 233.
'~ See, Price, supra note 1, at 659 (explaining the 1996 budget cuts and the
political machinations involved in having the cuts restored to the budget).
180 US Far-Right Groups Target the FDA, MARKETLElTER, Feb. 6, 1995,
available in WESTLAW, 1995 WL 2151645 (reporting that Citizens for a Sound
Economy set aside a good part of its $10 million budget to reform issues, Newt
Gingrich's Progress and Freedom Foundation devoted $500,000 to design a pri-
vate drug approval process, and the Washington Legal Foundation started an
advertising campaign against the FDA).
181 Id See also, Annas, supra note 1.
'~ See supra, note 10 and accompanying text.
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49company providing a drug and the physician prescribing it only increase and
exploit the patient's suering by providing drugs with a false promise of help and
hope.'83 Problems of a perceived drug lag are, according to FDA supporters,
the product of the inherent tensions in the incentives of a drug reviewer: if
a reviewer approves an unsafe drug that later proves to have serious adverse
events, the reviewer faces a maelstrom of public and Congressional anger for
having approved the drug; however, if the reviewer fails to approve a benecial
drug, the failure will probably go unnoticed. '~'
While nothing as yet has concretely developed from all the rancor over the
reform of the FDA, the debate and the criticisms leveled at the agency have
spurred it to act on its own behalf In an eort to provide quicker access to
life-saving treatments for AIDS and cancer patients, the FDA has implemented
a fast-track approval process, which allows marketing of these drugs after Phase
H trials, and a treatment [ND program, which allows certain patients expedited
access to investigational drugs.'85 Legislation from Congress has given the FDA
the authority to collect user fees from drug companies, which helps to fund
additional reviewers and thereby reduce the
'~ Amas, supra note 1. Annas argues strenuously that the reforms imple-
mented in the wake of the AIDS crisis have threatened to transform the [FDA]
from a consumer protection agency into a medical technology promotion agency;
and [have] put AIDS patients, already suering from an incurable disease, at
further risk of psychological, physical and nancial exploitation by those who
would sell them useless drugs. Id at 772. He goes on to argue that true compas-
sion for AIDS patients does not involve dispensing false hope or unreasonable
hype, Id., and that the strict scientic standards that have been used by the
FDA prevent risk[ing] the health of all who later use a drug that has been too
hastily approved. Id. at 797.
184 Rutherford, supra note 1, at 214.
185 See Hutt and Merrill, supra note 8, at 552-566 (discussing the eect
of the AIDS crisis on the FDA's drug approval process). For explanations of
fast-track approval and treatment INDs, see Walsh and Pyrich, supra note 1,
at 950-51.
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50amount of time needed to review NDAs.'86 The FDA has also participated in
conferences with its international counterparts with the intention of harmonizing
international drug review standards.'87 Finally, the FDA has begun experiment-
ing, on a limited basis, with contracting out some of its regulatory tasks to third
parties.'~
With all the reforms it has implemented, the FDA has concluded that it is
becoming more ecient and has oered the statistics to prove it. In his two
most recent addresses to the Food and Drug Law Institute, FDA Commissioner
Kessler has supported his conclusion that the FDA is a worldwide leader when
it comes to the rapid and ecient review and approval of new drugs'89 with a
stream of statistics showing a decline in the time the FDA requires to review and
approve a new drug. The median time to approval has been steadily declining,
reaching an all-time low of 15.1 months for calendar year l996.'~ That decline
has been true for all drugs, both
.'p)rity and standard, with priority drugs actually posting a median review
time of 7.8
months.'9' Comparing the FDA's performance with that of other countries,
Dr. Kessler
186 PRESCRIPTION DRUG USER FEE ACT, Pub. L. No. 102-571, 106
Stat. 4491 (1992).
187 Katz, supra note 1, at 580.
188 Walsh and Pyrich., supra note 1, at 973-8 1 (discussing the FDA's ex-
perience with private contracting and with working out the practical and legal
problems associated with it).
189 David A. Kessler, Remarks By the Commissioner of Food and Drugs, 51
FooD & DRUG L.J. 207, 208 (1996) (reprinting speech made to The Food and
Drug Law Institute's 38th Annual Educational Conference, Dec. 12-13, 1995)
[hereinafter Remarks 199S].
190 David A. Kessler, Remarks By the Commissioner of Food and Drugs, 52
FOOD & DRUG Li 1 (1997) (reprinting speech made to The Food and Drug Law
Institute's 40th Annual Educational Conference, Dec. 10-11, 1996) [hereinafter
Remarks 1996].
191 Id at 2. The FDA labels certain drugs as priority drugs, when those
drugs are
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51concluded that the median times to approval for the United States are faster
than those in the European Union (EU)'92 and that the FDA is often the rst
country to approve most new drugs.'93 The posted eciency improvements ap-
pear to have come without cost, as Dr. Kessler noted that no drug was with-
drawn for either safety or ecacy reasons.'94
The improvements appear to be real. In its report before the House Subcom-
mittee on Health and Environment, the General Accounting Oce (GAO) con-
cluded that [NDAs] are moving more quickly through the review and approval
process and that the amount of time to obtain an approval is approximately
the same in this country and in the United Kingdom.'95 The GAO reported a
decrease in the time taken for NDA approvals from 33 months in 1987 to 19
191( continued)
intended to treat serious illnesses or illnesses for which there are sub-optimal
or no current treatments. Priority drugs receive expedited consideration in the
drug approval process. Hutt and Merrill, supra note 8, at 529. NDAs entering
the FDA are compared against a matrix [that classies] NDAs according to
chemical type and therapeutic potential to determine their priority for review.
Id
192 Id at 4.
'~' Remarks 199S, supra note 189, at 208.
~ Remarks 1996, supra note 190, at 5. The time frame dening the period in
which no drug was withdrawn is unclear, but Dr. Kessler appears to be referring
to calendar year 1996 up to the time of his speech.
195 Mary R Hamilton, FDA Review Times, General Accounting Oce, State-
ment by the Director of Program Evaluation in Human Services Areas to the
Subcommittee on Health and Environment, Committee on Commerce, House
of Representatives, May 2, 1996, available at http://www.access.gpo.gov [here-
inafter GAO Report]. Hamilton concluded that the consistency of all our results
supports the conclusion that the reduction in time is real and not an artifact of
how time is measured. Id
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52months in 1992.196 The report also showed the FDA to be at least equivalent to
the UK in the time it takes to review a new drug. In comparing the performance
of the FDA and its UK counterpart with respect to eleven new drugs approved
between 1986 and 1992, the GAO concluded that the approval times for NCEs
in the US were actually shorter than those of the
197
While the empirical data suggests real improvement at the FDA, critics
remain dissatised with the FDA's performance. Critics say that the FDA's
statistics focus only on the FDA's review time and not on total drug development
time, which they claim is still abysmally long.'98 Because the FDA continues
to adhere to strict testing requirements, an NCE spends too much time in the
laboratory before nding its way to the market. Thus, reforms that would
reduce the amount of data that an NDA must include and eliminate duplicative
tests are still necessary.'99
B. Current Reform Proposals
Current reform proposals can be broadly categorized under three rubrics: (1)
privatization proposals, (2) proposals aimed at adopting eective and ecient
foreign drug approval procedures, and (3) miscellaneous proposals designed to
address particular problems in the process. Analyzed against the backdrop
of the Prozac controversy, however, each of these proposals fails in signicant
respects.
196 Id at Chapter 0:3.
~ Id at Chapter 0:4.3.
198 See, e.g., FDA Overhaul is Sought Despite Some Improvement, CHEM-
ICAL MIKT. REp. 16, Nov. 20, 1995, available in WESTLAW, 1995 WL
8079076.
'~ Walsh and Pyrich, supra note 1, at 93 6-7.
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53I. Privatization Proposals
(a) Summary of Current Privatization Proposals
Loosely speaking, privatization has become a short-hand expression for the
idea of quicker, more ecient government.2'~~' Its forms vary drastically, from
complete dismantling of the FDA and the use of market incentives to police
the safety and ecacy of drugs to allowing the FDA to contract with private
groups on a limited basis to perform some of the tasks that overburden the
agency. The guiding principle for all the forms of privatization positioned on
the continuum is that the free market system guides the entity [the FDA] to
make the most economically ecient (and therefore most desirable) decisions.20'
Many of the privatization reform proposals cluster around the central idea that
at least some use of private groups and an explicit requirement for the FDA to
consider both the costs and benets of its actions during the course of the drug
approval process would decrease the FDA's monopolistic control over the drug
approval process and would promote more ecient results.
Leading the discussion on privatization, Congress has come forward with a
range of reform proposals that all advocate some kind of privatization but that
vary widely in how much authority the FDA would retain.202 In the House of
Representatives, Representative Ron Wyden
200 Rutherford, supra note 1, at 203.
201 Id Rutherford has summarized and synthesized many of the privatization
proposals being debated at the time of her article. The proposals include creat-
ing time-based communication incentives, creating time-based economic action
incentives, providing incentives to approve and removing disincentives to delay
for FDA employees, requiring the FDA to make a cost-benet analysis on all
major .iture regulations, and relying on other bodies to provide safety and
ecacy data. Id at 223.
202 The major bills mentioned here are more thoroughly discussed in Price,
supra note
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54(D-Or.) introduced a bill providing for limited areas where domestic third par-
ties could review drugs, biologics, and medical devices. A House Republican
Task Force on FDA Reform introduced several bills that would greatly cur-
tail the FDA's role by essentially limiting its inction to that of exercising veto
power over third party reviews. Striking a balance between these two proposals,
Senator Nancy Kassebaum (R-Ka.) introduced a bill that allows for quicker ap-
proval of new drugs by statutorily decreasing the amount of time that the FDA
has for review and, if the deadline is not met, allowing third-party review of the
NDA. This bill would also allow one well-controlled study to prove the safety
and eectiveness of the new drug203 and would create a category of automatic
approval if the drug is approved by the UK or the EU. 2C14
Private organizations have made their own proposals, which have primarily
been grounded in the principle that reliance on market incentives and the tort
system will produce the proper incentive for manufacturers to produce safe and
eective drugs.~ Most of these proposals envision the FDA's role as limited to
that of an information provider. The Progress and Freedom Foundation, for
example, would completely privatize the approval process, relegating the FDA
to minimal oversight of third party reviewers and to conducting postmarketing
surveillance of drugs
202( .. continued)
I, at 660-663.
203 Streamlined FDA? Not So Fast, NEWSL. - PEOPLE'S MED. SOc'Y 4,
June 1, 1996, available in WESTLAW, 1996 WL 10159392.
204 Price, supra note 1, at 662.
205 Rutherford, supra note 1, at 205-6.
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55already on the market.206 While the details dier from group to group, most
rely on third parties to oversee the preapproval process and industry to develop
its own voluntary standards. The drug industry, speaking through the Phar-
maceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) has advocated
settingup a panel to review the FDA's performance.207
Some legal commentators have developed and advanced another proposaL208
Their scheme would create private certication bodies, which would work un-
der the FDA's supervision and would assume responsibility for some of the
FDA's regulatory tasks. Because the FDA is a politically accountable body with
substantial expertise accumulated over the course of its existence, Walsh and
Pyrich advocate delegating only those tasks that do not involve more weighty
risk-benet analyses. At all times, however, the FDA would retain ultimate
authority over the decisions made by private entities.
Those advocating privatization have argued that numerous benets to be
gained by limiting the scope of the FDAts role in the approval of drugs make
this mode of reform particularly desirable. Primarily, privatization would free
resources for other aspects of the FDA's mission by delegating some of its cur-
rent regulatory tasks.2 ~ Though there is little data to support the hypothesis,
theoretically privatization would result in decreased drug development
206 Walsh and Pyrich, supra note 1, at 993-4.
207 Rutherford, supra note 1, at 207.
208 For a complete discussion of this proposal, see Walsh and Pyrich, supra
note 1, at
998-1016.
209 Price, supra note 1, at 665. See also Rutherford, supra note 1, at 210;
Walsh and Pyiich, supra note 1, at 955.
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56time and expense, making more safe and eective drugs available to consumers
at lower cost.210 Regardless, eciency gains brought about by the use of third
parties would decrease the costs associated with the current system. 211 Others
have suggested that privatization may help to reduce the impact of politics on
the approval process.212
(b) Critique of Privatization: Allowing only Limited Privatization
Supporters of privatization are quick to dismiss the major objection to this
mode of reform
{ that private approval bodies, who will presumably have tighter links to
the drug industry than the FDA currently does,213 will shake the American
public's condence in the safety and ecacy of the drug supply because of a
perceived lack of appropriate incentives to monitor safety and ecacy. The
Prozac controversy, however, argues against dismissing that objection so easily.
As the story of Prozac demonstrates, consumers will operate their own process
of drug approval, regardless of the FDA's judgment of the safety and ecacy
of a new drug, and in so doing will tolerate very little risk. In the absence of a
politically accountable agency's review of new drugs, the costs of this informal
process would escalate as consumers compensate for the lack an independent
judgment of safety and ecacy.
The accountability that comes from having government make the decisions
on the
210 Id
211 Id
212 Walsh and Pyrich, supra note 1, at 956.
213 Rutherford, supra note 1, at 207. This seems likely, as most proposals
require the drug companies seeking review to pay the independent group to
evaluate its drug.
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57marketing of drugs makes the current process acceptable to the American public.214
Thus, any reform that diminishes that accountability will produce a crisis of con-
dence that will inhibit patients from accepting necessary drug treatments.215
With militant opposition to Prozac and an intense .iror over its safety, patients
quit taking Prozac, whether or not advised to by their physicians.216 This oc-
curred even in the face of information provided by physicians, Lilly and the FDA
that contradicted media accounts of a lack of safety, suggesting that consumers
will not necessarily respond to information disclosure in deciding whether or not
to accept a drug.
While stringent conict of interest rules designed to combat appearances of
impropriety may partially address the problem of acceptability of a privatized
process, the problem is not solved. The American experience with the approval
of new drugs has developed from a politically accountable governmental body;
thus, overcoming the perception of diminished accountability will be dicult. In
fact, having an accountable agency does not guarantee the public's condence
in a new drug.
The accountability argument can only go so far, though, for some of the
privatization proposals limit third party assumption of FDA tasks to narrow
areas where the FDA expends resources on tasks that divert its attention from
more important concerns. A limited role for
214 Harvey Teft Drug Approval in England and the United States, 33 AM.
J. COMP. LAW 567, 580-81 (1985).
215 See Walsh and Pyrich, supra note 1, at 966-71 (discussing the problem
of accountability by private organizations).
216 Supra, notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
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58privatization, along the lines of that proposed by Walsh and Pyrich,217 might
be appropriate. Limited privatization gives third parties responsibility for FDA
tasks such as the review of generic drug applications and the inspection of
manufacturing and research facilities for compliance with FDA regulations.2'8
By delegating only those tasks that do not involve more sensitive concerns and
the more important decisions about safety and ecacy, limited privatization
would not compromise the acceptability of the approval process. At the same
time, however, adopting limited privatization could achieve some of the benets
that supporters of privatization cite, such as the release of resources for other
purposes.
2. Adoption of Foreign Procedures
(a) Summary of Current Proposals
Some commentators have approached the problem of determining how to
reform the FDA by comparing the US system with the systems of foreign coun-
tries. These analyses have generally concluded that the US could decrease the
drug lag by either adopting some of the procedures of foreign countries or by
relying on the data developed during another country's process.
One form of comparison has focused on the drug approval system set up
in the UK and on the dierence in timing between the two systems.219 While
the UK focuses its eorts on postmarketing review of the claims made before
marketing, the FDA operates a front-end-loaded
217 Supra, note 208 and accompanying text. This proposal will be referred
to as limited privatization.
218 Id at 1002-1009.
219 The rationale for this comparison is that the US and UK have substan-
tially similar systems, but the UK manages to approve drugs for marketing
much more quickly. See Diliman, supra note 1, at 931.
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59system of approval, requiring extensive demonstrations of safety and ecacy
before the drug goes on the market.220 Contributing to and accounting for this
dierence is the underlying British philosophy of drug approval, which is said
to accommodate more readily the
unpalatable truth that the research process continues even after a licensed
drug has been made available for general prescription, and that serious, rare
side eects will not necessarily manifest themselves until a drug has been used
by a far greater proportion of the population than is feasible even with extensive
pre-market testing.221
Specically, the UK cuts the amount of test data necessary prior to approval;
for example, preclinical testing consists of only six month chronic toxicity studies
in two animal species prior to clinical testing.222 As long as no serious problems
occur with the drug in clinical testing, the drug is placed on the market, and
most of the proof of safety and ecacy arrives postmarketing. The UK has an
established system for physicians to report adverse drug reactions directly to
the regulatory agency, a system that has been more widely used than its US
counterpart.223 In order to identif~' and minimize potential harm from a new
drug, the UK may limit the ability to prescribe it to hospital pharmacies or
certain medical specialists.224
Advocates of adopting a British approach to drug regulation argue for alter-
ing US
220 See Relihan, supra note I, at 246. For a thorough comparison of the two
systems, see Dillman, supra note 1, at 925-3 5.
221 Teft supra note 214, at 579. The FDA and medical experts accept this
idea that drugs are not lly tested prior to marketing. See infra, note 226 and
accompanying text. However, it has not been accommodated into the existing
drug approval scheme.
222 Dillman, supra note 1, at 931. Cf to the one year of animal testing
required by the FDA. Supra note 16.
223 Relihan, supra note 1, at 245.
224 Teft supra note 214, at 579.
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60procedures to fall more in line with the UK, primarily by shifting the FDA~s
emphasis to postmarketing surveillance. One version of this proposal advocates
reducing Phase III clinical trials and increasing postmarketing surveillance.225
In structuring this proposal, Wardell argues that Phase m testing is largely
duplicative, because by the end of Phase II testing most drug testing has devel-
oped general evidence of overall ecacy, the most common adverse reactions,
and the most obvious precautions for use. The NDA could be submitted at the
beginning of Phase II testing and reviewed concurrently with Phase 11 trials; al-
ternatively, a preliminary NDA could be submitted and the remainder of Phase
[1 data submitted at the end of the review process.
By shifting the focus of regulation to postmarketing surveillance, advocates
argue that the reduction in the premarketing approval process would allow drugs
to be marketed sooner and at less cost, while at the same time regulators could
maintain a safe and ecacious drug supply through vigorous postmarketing
surveillance designed to provide the means for swift reaction to problems that
develop in the use of the drug. Advocates of this approach point out that
this is the de facto result of the current FDA system. In spite of its focus on
premarketing testing, the FDA cannot make complete determinations about the
safety and ecacy of a drug, because no matter how large or thorough a clinical
trial is, it cannot uncover every problem that can come to light once a product
is widely used.226 Thus, the FDA obtains little more evidence of safety and
225 William Wardell, Can Improved Postmarketing Surveillance Permit Ear-
lier Drug Approval?, 12 DRUG THERAPY 143 (Feb. 1982). Wardell does not
believe that all drugs are appropriate for this kind of review, but those drugs
that are could be identied early in Phase II.
226 Kessler, supra note 46, at 2765. Because a drug can be tested in only
so many human subjects before it is approved, the studies accompanying an
NDA will not reveal reactions with an incidence rate of one in ve thousand,
one in ten thousand, or in some cases, one in one thousand. Id The limits of
premarketing testing have been noted by others besides the FDA.
(continued...)
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61ecacy before marketing than its UK counterpart, while relying on its system
of postmarketing surveillance, primarily the MIED WATCH program, to catch
any problems that later develop.227 Because of its unique advantages, this par-
ticular proposal, shifting the timing of FDA regulation, will form the basis of
the proposal outlined in Part V.
Another proposal has been to advocate some form of harmonization of
the FDA's standards with those of other sophisticated drug -producing and -
consuming countries, such as the UK, the EU, and Japan. This mode of reform
would develop international standards for preclinical and clinical testing, which
would then allow the FDA to accept data from tests conducted in other coun-
tries. One specic proposal has advocated producing an international treaty
on premarketing drug approval requirements.228 The FDA has already begun
moving toward this goal by participating in the International Conferences on
Harmonization, designed to develop uniform guidelines that will assist the par-
ticipating countries in developing harmonious regulations related to the devel-
opment and testing of new drugs.229
A variation of this proposal argues for according some kind of evidentiary
status to other
226(.. continued)
~The detection of ADRs [Adverse Drug Reactions] is inhibited by the ve
too's of premarketing trials: too few [test subjects], too simple [because patients
tested do not have any medical problems other than those the drug is supposed
to treat], too narrow [because patients receiving concurrent drug therapy are
excluded from the samples], too median-aged [because the young and the elderly
are generally not tested], and too brief Scott et al., supra note 53, at 1785.
227 The reality of drug testing, however, indicates that problems will develop,
for precisely the reasons outlined supra, note 226 and accompanying text.
228 Wall, supra note 175, at 339.
229 Joseph G. Contrera, The Food and Drug Administration and the In-
ternational Conference on Harmonization: How Harmonious will International
Pharmaceutical Regulations Become?, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 927 (1995).
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62countries' ndings.230 For example, in the legislation introduced by Senator
Kassebaum, new drugs approved in the EU or the UK could receive deemed
approval status in the US. If the FDA does not complete its review of an NDA
and take some armative action with respect to the drug within thirty days
of the statutory deadline, a sponsor who has received approval from either the
EU or the UK could have its drug deemed approved on the basis of the foreign
approval and then proceed to market it.23'
In another proposal, approval by the EUs new regulatory authority, the
European Medicines Evaluation Agency (EMEA), would trigger two statutory
occurrences: (1) the EMIEA's approval would constitute substantial evidence
of ecacy, thereby reducing the need for much of the clinical testing that would
otherwise be conducted in the US, and (2) EMEA approval would trigger a 180
day period in which the FDA would review the same drug, with the FDA's
failure to act within that time period resulting in automatic approval for the
drug to be marketed in the US.232 Because the EMEA would adhere to similarly
rigorous standards for research and scientic evidence, the FDA would arguably
gain nothing by putting a new drug through its own paces. 233
Carrying this argument further, some advocates say that practical reality
may force the
230 This has been one of the proposals advocated by PhRMA. Rutherford,
supra note I, at 207.
231 Price, supra note 1, at 662.
232 Note, supra note 1, at 20 18-20.
233 Indeed, it may tum out to be true that the EMEA standards of proof
for new drugs are more rigorous than those imposed by the FDA. Note, supra
note 1, at 2019 (citing Katz, supra note 1, at 585).
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63FDA to adopt the ndings of the EMIEA. The size of the EU market and
its prot potential would make it more attractive for drug companies to seek
approval from the EU rst; thus, many of the initial resources that go into
drug development would conform to the EMEA's testing requirements rather
than the FDA's testing requirements. If drug companies were to gear their drug
development toward EMEA approval, the US would be faced with a longer drug
lag. Thus, in order to get new drugs into American consumers' hands, the FDA
would have to accept the EMIEA's ndings.234
(b) Critique of the Adoption of Foreign Findings
The FDA has been participating in the International Conferences on Har-
monization, which have sought to standardize the testing requirements for drug
companies in all countries so that participating countries can rely on data
collected in each country. It would be premature, however, to place a statu-
tory overlay onto this process, which would require the FDA to review a drug
approved under another country's scheme expeditiously or to accord another
country's approval decision deemed approval status. As the International Con-
ferences on Harmonization make clear, there are numerous dierences in the
processes of the various sophisticated drug-producing countries. Until those
dierences in standards can be smoothed out, statutory implementation of a
requirement that international data have a certain evidentiary value is unwise.
The EMEA provides the best reason for allowing the FDA to harmonize
its procedures with international counterparts by itself Because the EMEA is a
new agency and experience with its results is very limited, exactly what deemed
approval status for drugs approved in the EU would mean is dicult to tell. In
addition, the proposals that would shorten drug development
234 Note, supra note 1, at 2021.
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64time by giving the EMEA's approval a certain evidentiary value do not ad-
equately account for the EMiEA's process. The statute creating the EMEA
actually authorizes two procedures for approving a new drug.235 The rst pro-
cedure, the centralized procedure, is a process that, at least currently, will only
be used for some pharmaceutical products. Under the centralized procedure, the
new drug product is evaluated according to the procedures used by the EMIEA,
which will require adequate evidence of safety, ecacy and quality. The second
procedure, the decentralized procedure, makes use of the drug approval pro-
cesses currently in use in each of the EU's Member States. Once a Member
State approves a drug for marketing, the drug's sponsor can apply for mutual
recognition by all the Member States. The other states must recognize the
approval and allow the drug onto the market unless there are grounds for sup-
posing that the authorization of the medicinal product concerned may present
a risk to public health.236 This decentralized procedure of mutual recognition
will become mandatory after January 1, 1998.237 Thus, a statutory requirement
could force the FDA to accept a drug onto the US market that has undergone
its only scientic testing according to the requirements of countries with less
stringent in their standards than the US, the UK and other sophisticated coun-
tries simply because, as a legal matter, the EU or the UK has approved the
marketing of the drug based on the mandatory mutual
235 Richard F. Kingham et aL, The New European Medicines Agency, 49
FooD &
DRUG L.J. 301(1994). Kingham et al. Provide a thorough explanation of
the new EMEA drug
approval process. An explanation of the centralized procedure for drug approvals
begins at 306.
An explanation of the decentralized procedure begins at 309.
236 Id at 311 (internal quotation marks omitted).
237 Id
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65recognition scheme. The result is likely to erode consumer condence in the
drug supply. 238 Countering this objection, supporters of adopting a deemed
approval requirement for the
FDA argue that the erosion of consumer condence in the US that would oc-
cur by automatically approving drugs subject to less stringent testing standards
can be combated by having the FDA take seriously its authority to veto drugs
coming into the US through the deemed approval process.239 However, because
the deemed approval process creates a statutory presumption that approval in
another country means that the drug is safe and eective, the FDA would have
to develop adequate evidence to combat that presumption, something that could
require more review than the thirty days most proposals give the FDA to object
to marketing of drugs approved in other countries. Moreover, if at any time the
FDA lacked the resources to compile the evidence to rebut the presumption, its
veto power would become ineective. Finally, any risk-benet calculus used by
another country in order to determine whether or not to approve a drug will
reect the unique assessments by that country's political process of what risks
and benets should count and how they should be weighed. That calculus will
not necessarily reect the risks and benets that risk-averse Americans would
consider acceptable.
In addition to the foregoing objections, one must ask what is to be gained
by legislative imperatives on the acceptance of foreign data and foreign ndings.
For this kind of reform to succeed, the FDA would have to adopt guidelines for
the acceptance of foreign data that would guarantee that the drugs that are
proposed for marketing in the United States have been subjected to the same
rigorous requirements that the FDA itself would require. For example, for the
use of
238 Price, supra note 1, at 670.
239 Id
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66EMIEA approval as substantial evidence of ecacy to require the same quality
of proof achieved under the current system, the FDA would also have to de-
termine the weight to be accorded the evidence produced by the two dierent
procedures for approval in the EU. The FDA has already begun this process and
has the substantial expertise and experience to determine what foreign approval
procedures and data are appropriate for it to consider. A statutory requirement
is not only premature but would also prevent the country-specic determina-
tions about foreign procedures and data that must occur in order to allow in
only those foreign-approved drugs that are safe and eective.
For example, while it is logical to conclude that using EMEA approval to
demonstrate substantial evidence of ecacy would shorten overall drug devel-
opment time, one must ask whether EMEA approval should always be aorded
this evidentiary value. Moreover, which EMIEA approval process { central-
ized or decentralized { would be sacient to constitute substantial evidence of
ecacy? Relying on the FDA to answer those questions would ensure
that drugs that take advantage of this proposal would still live up to the
stringent standards of the
FDA.240
3. Miscellaneous Reform Proposals
(a) Summary of Miscellaneous Proposals
240 A statutory requirement for the adoption of foreign ndings reects noth-
ing more, it seems, than an inherent distrust of the FDA to take advantage of
useful information developed in other countries, which is born of the legislative
knowledge that the FDA has not always acted responsibly in weighing what
foreign data is acceptable. While the FDA once refused to consider data even
though its current experience with accepting foreign data demonstrates that
there should never have been a problem, even now, in accepting foreign data,
the FDA has not done so unthinkingly. Instead, it has been involved in interna-
tional eorts to ensure that the data it does accept will be acceptable according
to its own standards. See Contrera, supra note 229.
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67Other proposals for reform have advocated specic measures designed to ad-
dress particular problems that arise out of the operation of the current system.
Primarily, critics of the current system have argued for the need for tort reform.
With such a stringent approval system in place and because of the expense
associated with meeting regulatory requirements, these advocates argue that
allowing recovery for drug-related injuries merely drives up the cost of new
drugs.24' Some have argued that regulatory compliance should be a complete
defense in tort,~'2 while others have suggested a statutory compensation scheme,
similar to Workers' Compensation, that provides compensation to those injured
without forcing a larger tax on new drugs in order to account for spiraling tort
liability.243 In any case, tort reform is a necessary component of any regula-
tory reform.2 Reform proposals should at least account for the extent to which
drug-related injuries are compensated, for that helps to determine how much
premarketing regulation is necessary.245
Noting that the drug lag surfaced after the 1962 Kefauver-Harris Amend-
ments required
241 Walsh and Pyrich, supra note 1, at 1016; Teft supra note 214, at 606-608.
242 For example, the Progress and Freedom Foundation has advocated this
position. Walsh and Pyrich, supra note 1, at 993-4.
243 Teft supra note 214, at 608. This suggestion is not explained in any great
detail.
244 Any reform of the FDA will also have to result in tort reform for drug-
induced injury in order to address the changes brought about by the reform.
However, this issue is beyond the scope of this paper as it requires, for proper
treatment, an extensive analysis of the current system and the available alter-
natives. For purposes of the proposal outlined infra, it is assumed that the
current tort system remains in place, with plainti~ able to sue for any alleged
harm caused by a drug but with diculties of scientic proof making recovery
unlikely. See TeW supra note 214, at 606-7 (explaining why the notion that
market deterrence can operate satisfactorily through the compensation mecha-
nism is particularly dicult to sustain in respect of drugs).
245 Teft supra note 214, at 606.
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68proof of ecacy prior to marketing, others have advocated removing or curtail-
ing the ecacy requirement, leaving the FDA responsible only for the safety of
new drugs. Beckner has developed the most convincing argument for this ap-
proach, arguing that the most eective correction of market failures.., is usually
the one that directly addresses the market failure.2 Beckner advocates altering
the current process to compensate for the market's disincentive to provide ade-
quate information on ecacy by mandating strict information disclosure rather
than by requiring premarketing proof of ecacy.247 Others, including Senator
Kassebaum248 and PhRMA249, would reduce the requirement from two well-
controlled studies of ecacy to one.
(b) Critiquing the Removal of the Ecacy Requirement
While it appears attractive to remove the ecacy requirement and limit the
FDA to responsibility for the safety of drugs because of the expected decrease
in drug development and approval time, this proposal would eliminate the ben-
ets gained by requiring some proof of ecacy. This elimination, for reasons
discussed below, would be unambiguously unethical. The specic example of
the eect of removing the ecacy requirement for antidepressants shows that
this reform could also cost as much as it might gain.
Patients receiving treatment are expected to give informed consent to the
treatment,
246 Beckner, supra note 1, at 560.
247 Id at 560-i.
244 US Far-Right Groups Target the FDA, supra note 180.
249 Rutherford, supra note 1, at 207.
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69except in limited circumstances.250 If a physician oers a drug to a patient but
cannot state armatively that the drug has been proven to be eective for the
condition being treated, then, as a practical matter, the patient ought not to
give consent. If the patient does consent to the treatment, then the patient is not
consenting to anything meaningful, because the patient is not consenting to a
treatment. Though it can be argued that the patient could provide meaningful,
informed consent to the fact that the drug may not be eective, in this case
the patient is essentially consenting to serve as a test subject for the drug. As
a research subject, the patient then should, at the very least, not be required
to pay for the treatment, as the benet gained from having the patient use the
drug belongs to the manufacturer. Others have carried the ethical argument
farther, arguing that research subject/patients' capacity to provide informed
consent is diminished because of the coercive power of the oer of treatment
in this situation,25' making greater safeguards for the protection of the patient
necessary.
Providing drugs that have not been proven ecacious also takes advantage
of patients, causing them to suer needlessly and driving up the costs of their
care.252 For example, antidepressants require several months of treatment before
the patient and the physician notice the
250 Patients in emergency need of treatment and patients who lack the ability
to provide meaningful consent to treatment, such as minors and incompetents,
are generally excluded from informed consent rules.
251 Annas, supra note I, at 777 (citing F.J. Ingelnger, Informed (But Une-
ducated)
Consent, 287 NEw ENG. J. MED. 465, 466 (1972) (noting that all research
volunteers are subtly coerced to provide consent but that these pres~es... are
but fractional shadows of those enclosing the patient-subject. Incapacitated..,
and fearful for his health and perhaps life, he is far from exercising a free power
of choice when the person to whom he anchors all his hopes asks him to consent
to experimental treatment) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
252 Supra note 183 and accompanying text.
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70full benecial eect. Moreover, antidepressant therapy requires a trial-and-
error process, which can be lengthy, to determine the proper treatment.253 If
the patient receives a drug that is not eective, the individual and social costs
imposed by the months of waiting to determine whether or not there will be a
therapeutic eect are substantial254 and the patient will suer needlessly. Thus,
doing away with the ecacy requirement does not provide a suitable answer to
the question of how to reform the drug approval process.
V. Reforming the FDA's Drug Approval Process: Learning from
Prozac
Because the current proposals have the limitations outlined above, there
needs to be another way to go about deciding how to reform the current FDA
drug approval process; thus, this section will rst present a new approach for
determining how to reform the process. Then, using the analysis of the premar-
keting testing of uoxetine, this section will propose reforms that are tailored to
remedy the problems seen in that process. Applying the functional approach to
antidepressants, the analysis of Prozac developed in this paper shows how drug
development time could be shortened without compromising safety and ecacy.
A. Separate Treatment for Individual Classes of Drugs: A Func-
tional Approach
253 Psychiatrists are advised to begin antidepressant ther-
apy with a 6-12 week trial
during which the physician selects a drug, experiments to nd the correct
dose and to ensure that there is some therapeutic eect for a few weeks, and
monitors side eects. At any time during this trial, the psychiatrist may change
the drug because of uncomfortable side eects or lack of therapeutic eect, which
begins the 6-12 week trial anew. At the end of twelve weeks, the psychiatrist
might change the medication because of a plateau in the patient's improvement,
which results from the drug's not being fully eective. Otherwise, the patient
should continue on drug therapy for four to nine months. Delgado and Gelen-
berg, supra note 132, at 270-74. ifa patient and physician use antidepressants
not known to be eective during this process, it could be a substantial period
of time before the patient is taking a therapeutic drug.
254 Supra note 123.
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71Reform should proceed by means of a functional approach, which separates
drugs into categories, considers the reform measures that are necessary and
proper for each category, and implements reform measures according to what is
appropriate for each category. As the issue is currently approached, reformers
consider proposals based on the perceived drug lag or based on the argument
that patients with life-threatening Thesses are being deprived of needed drug
treatments. As a result, they tailor the proposals and the measures implemented
around the need to address the problems associated with getting life-saving
treatments onto the market faster. However, these measures fail to address
what would happen in the case of drugs taken for chronic conditions or drugs
designed to treat illnesses where the risk-benet calculus is dramatically dierent
from that considered in connection with an illness, such as AIDS or cancer, that
will in most cases be terminal.
Economically, this functional approach makes sense. When faced with a drug
where the potential benets are substantial compared with the risks, the cost
of delaying the drug's entry onto the market is potentially large.2 For example,
consider AIDS drugs. There are currently no known cures for AIDS. If a drug
has the potential to cure the disease, its benets would be substantial, not only
in the lives saved immediately but also in the ability to treat those who are
currently I-ilV-positive. By delaying the time it takes to get the drug to the
market, many AIDS patients would have died or would have progressed to the
point that any treatment would no longer be eective.
While patients with terminal diseases have been correctly characterized as
having little to
255 The basis of this is argument is found in Mendeloft supra
note 1, at 209.
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72lose and much to gain,256 that perspective is not necessarily shared by pa-
tients with other illnesses, such as depression. Prior to the marketing of Prozac,
there were treatments available for depression that could be used, though pa-
tients did not always comply with them. 257 In discovering this new treatment,
its benets were not so easily quantiable. While Prozac was clearly a safer
drug to place in a potentially suicidal patient's hands, no one knew for certain
how eective the drug would be in treating depression. Thus, it would not
necessarily prevent more deaths than it might cause. Accordingly, the cost of
delaying its entry onto the market in order to undergo premarketing approval
would be less than that of an AIDS drug, because patients would be able to
receive other treatments in the interim period between discovery and marketing.
By requiring the same level of proof of safety and ecacy for both AIDS drugs
and antidepressants, the FDA has imposed a greater cost on American citizens
suering from AIDS than on those suering from depression. Thus, a lower
standard of proof for the AIDS drug would bring the drug to the market earlier,
thereby reducing the costs associated with the approval of the AIDS drug?58
A lower standard of proof for Prozac, though, could have put the drug on the
market even though it might not have been eective. Thus, the cost imposed on
society is to place patients on a drug that does not work, while the patient bears
the cost of an extended period of time of suering from depression.259 Therefore,
dierent standards would reect the unique positions of patients with dierent
illnesses, and an approval process tailored to the unique
256 Dillman, supra note 1, at 944.
257 See supra, note 67-68 and accompanying text.
258 Mendeloft supra note 1 at 209-10.
259 See supra, note 123 (discussing the costs associated with depression).
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73position of patients with particular illnesses would allow the FDA to account
for those dierences and for the dierence in the risk-benet calculus. 260
Moreover, requiring the same process for all drugs may be inecient because
there are unique variables that a process designed to serve all categories of
drugs does not account for; thus, by breaking the drugs down by category, a
functional approach would determine the kinds of testing appropriate for each
category. This would omit the costs associated with testing that provides only
a tangentially related piece of information about the drug.
For example, with antidepressants, the extensive animal testing required is
not necessary or helpful because of the lack of good animal models of depression;
thus, the conclusions that can be drawn, based on animal testing, about the
eect of an NCE on a psychiatric condition are limited. It is well known within
the scientic community that there are no good, comprehensive animal models of
depression.261 In simulating depressive symptoms in animals, researchers often
use a form of conditioning, whereby the animal is continually thwarted in its
eort to reach a desirable goal. Animals conditioned in such a manner frequently
exhibit symptoms associated
260 At least implicitly, the FDA already does this. Certain drugs are deter-
mined to be
priority drugs and, as such, receive an expedited review once the NDA has
been led. Supra, page ??.
261 William T. McKinney, Basis of Development of Animal Models in Psy-
chiatry: An Overview, in ANIMAL MODELS OF DEPRESSION, supra note
169, at 3(... there is no such thing as a comprehensive animal model for de-
pression, mania, or, for that matter, of any psychiatric syndrome. Furthermore,
there never will be). See also, P. S.J. Spencer, Animal Models for Screening
New Agents, 3 SuPP. BRrr. J. CLIN. PHARMACOLOGY 5 (1976) (So little is
known about the aetiology and pathophysiology of the mental conditions we are
attempting to combat, that the neuropharmacologist is unable to create typical,
specic, model conditions in animals suitable for the detection and evaluation
of new agents); Jacqueline N. Crawley, et at, Animal Models of Self-Destructive
Behavior and Suicide, 8 THE PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS OF NORTH AMER-
ICA 299, 299 (1985) (noting that animal models cannot be made to illustrate
the complexities of human psychopathologies).
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74with depression in humans. On this basis, an NCE is introduced to attempt
to relieve those symptoms. Those symptoms, however, are poor reections of
naturally-occurring depression (or other psychiatric illnesses), and may often
be a better model of a general 'stress adaptation response' than of any spe-
cic clinical disorder.262 When not using these methods of inducing depressive
symptoms in animals, investigators will induce the symptoms in the animal by
means of another chemical, such as reserpine.263 Thus, animal testing could not
possibly reveal much at all about the potential therapeutic value of a drug for
naturally-occurring psychiatric conditions, and this was true with the animal
testing of uoxetine.2 ~
Against this category-by-category consideration of reform stands the ob-
jection that splintering the consideration of reform would itself be inecient.
Looking at the drugs by category would require an enormous proliferation of
regulations and guidelines for all the dierent categories of drugs available and
the time and resources spent in making category-specic rules could be bet-
ter spent in other ways. In addition, the process of making a category-specic
review of drug approval requirements would be costly.
In fact, though, the cost may not be prohibitive if the FDA could make use
of its expertise to accomplish this approach. The FDA may already adhere to
a kind of category-specic review through its use of expert advisory commit-
tees, which would provide a mechanism for reducing the costs associated with
category-specic denition of the process. These committees are composed
262 Dan J. Stein, et al. Behavioral Disorders in Veterinary Practice: Rele-
vance to Psychiatry, 35 COMPREHENSIVE PSYCHIATRY 275, 281 (1994).
263 See supra notes 169-170 and accompanying text (discussing the limita-
tions of reserpine-induced models of depression).
264 Id
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75of specialists in various areas who advise the FDA regarding drugs in specic
categories.265 These expert panels would be in a unique position to inuence
and make determinations about the appropriateness of the approval process and
its testing requirements for drugs within their specialty. The institutional costs,
therefore, of tailoring the approval process along category-specic lines would
not necessarily be great. While it would require a considerable eort to examine
the categories of drugs separately, a drug approval process tailored to the specic
needs and requirements of various drugs would have the advantage of streamlin-
ing approval of all the drugs within that category without compromising safety
and ecacy.
Another objection to this approach is that individual patients suering from
each of the diseases all have the same calculus { the benets to them of receiving
a drug will outweigh the costs of a lower standard of proof; thus, the analysis
supporting category-specic consideration is fundamentally awed. However,
such a subjective measure of the risk-benet calculus for individual patients
should not inuence the overall process of applying a functional approach to
reform analysis. Viewing the larger picture, it is quite clear that the benets
and risks are dierent for a patient suering from a terminal disease than for a
patient suering from a chronic condition.
More to the point, however, is the objection that the lessons leamed about
one category of drugs are equally applicable to all drugs; thus, the determina-
tions made when considering Prozac in isolation are not unique to psychiatric
drugs. For example, the current drug approval process
265 The Psychopharmacological Drugs Advisory Committee, for example, is
the advisory committee responsible for making recommendations to the FDA
on drugs that act on psychiatric conditions { the psychotropic medications { for
treatment of diseases such as depression and schizophrenia.
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76as a whole has been criticized for relying too heavily on animal studies.266 That
proposition cannot be veried, however, absent a category-specic consideration
of the need for reform. While it may be true that category-specic consideration
will ultimately yield the same approval process for all drugs, the time spent
considering the drugs by category will result in a drug approval process that
can armatively be said to be the most ecient process for each drug category.
At least one commentator has suggested that the FDA's current bias toward
stringent standards of proof and exacting requirements for proving safety and
ecacy are correct and that these standards should be uniform for all drugs.267
Responding to the eorts to expedite approval of AIDS drug treatments, An-
nas argues that where the illness is life-threatening, doing anything other than
requiring the drug to undergo the same rigorous procedures to prove safety and
ecacy produces false hope for patients and lengthens the time it takes to de-
velop a truly eective remedy for the illness. Annas, however, ignores the reality
that the current system of drug approval in use at the FDA has imposed severe
costs on the American public by delaying
266 Dillman, supra note 1, at 93 8-9 (noting that animal models provide
weak results in determining drugs' eects on higher human functions, such as
the central nervous system, that animal testing does not reveal all the toxic
eects associated with a drug or predict drug interactions, and that when the
risks and benets of a drug are weighed according to the results of animal
testing, drugs of clear value are withheld).
267 Annas, supra note 1. Annas suggests that uniform procedures may in
fact be legally required, under U.S. v. Rutherford 442 U.S. 544 (1979). The
Supreme Court held that the FDA was within its authority to refuse to prove
laetrile as a cancer treatment, because the FDCA did not authorize the statu-
tory requirements of safety and eectiveness to be deemed irrelevant for patients
with certain diseases. The plaintis had argued that even though laetrile was
unproven as a safe and eective treatment, they should be able to receive it in
the US because their illness was terminal. Dening the procedures for testing,
however, falls within the agency's discretionary power, as nothing in the func-
tional approach would remove the statutory requirement that drugs be proved
safe and eective.
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77safe and ecacious treatments and driving up the price of pharmaceuticals.268
The functional approach would merely develop the most ecient means for
achieving the end of putting only safe and eective drugs on the market.
2. Shortening Drug Development Time
The analysis of the premarketing testing of uoxetine showed two clear prob-
lems with the standard testing requirements: (1) the process increased the cost
of developing uoxetine and delayed its entry onto the market by requiring un-
necessary tests; and (2) the clinical testing did not establish either safety or
ecacy under the conditions that most patients would use the drug.
First, because animal studies do not clearly elucidate the therapeutic eects
that a drug
69
might have,2 requiring preclinical data to establish potential therapeutic
value is inecient and unnecessary. Thus, the company should not have had to
demonstrate the therapeutic potential of
uoxetine through animal testing.270 Had this requirement been foregone for
uoxetine, the process would have cut down on the four years of animal testing
that uoxetine underwent,27' allowing clinical testing sooner.
One might argue that the studies of uoxetine's eect on reserpine-induced
depression at
268 Price, supra note 1, at 657-65 8 (the drug lag has cost. . . U.S. consumers
untold losses by decreasing their ability to select among benecial therapeutic
alternatives).
269 Supra notes 26 1-263 and accompanying text.
270 This argument should not be interpreted to mean that all animal testing
should be forgone. Clearly, proof of safety in animals is a necessary prerequisite
to human testing. There are other reasons for using animal tests in the drug
development process. Supra note 261. All this argument stands for is the
proposition that where animal testing data is unhelpful or only tangentially
informative, the approval process should not require that information.
271 See supra, notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
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78least signaled the possibility of a therapeutic eect from the use of uoxetine
in humans, and, without at least some indication of therapeutic eect, it would
be unethical to allow patients to undergo clinical trials. Drawing an inference
between studies linking serotonin levels to depression and the fact that animal
studies conrmed that uoxetine acted selectively on serotonin, however, could
have established the potential for therapeutic value. Thus, if the requirement
of animal proof of therapeutic potential is retained, then the level of proof
necessary to establish the potential should be expanded to allow the drawing
of such an inference. Otherwise, animal testing adds little to the information
collected about uoxetine and wastes resources which could have been used on
expanded clinical trials of uoxetine's ecacy.
Second, although most patients would be taking uoxetine for several months,
clinical testing occurred in only four to six week trials; thus, the approval pro-
cess did not elicit information on safety and ecacy that was relevant for most
patients. While this would seem to argue for more clinical testing, there are
limits to what premarketing testing can achieve. 272 A more palatable remedy
for the lack of long-term data is a variation of the plan proposed by Wardell.273
Thus, by amending testing requirements to lengthen the clinical trials in Phase
H, testing would approximate more closely the conditions under which most
patients would take the drug for 274 On Wardell's theory that Phase Ill testing
will not reveal much more than the general information already gathered on
safety and ecacy, Phase Ill testing could then be
272 Supra note 226 and accompanying text.
273 Supra note 225 and accompanying text.
274 For example, the clinical trials could run for eight to ten weeks, which
would more closely approximate the period of time most patients would be using
the drug.
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79eliminated and the NDA reviewed after the completion of Phase H testing.
This approach of increasing the length of the clinical trial may have addressed
one of the shortcomings of the uoxetine studies. The review of the SBA noted
that the proof of ecacy was limited.275 Given that antidepressant ecacy is not
generally established until the patient has been on antidepressant therapy for
several months, though, longer clinical trials may have provided the additional
data necessary to establish more convincingly that uoxetine was eective in
treating depression.
In making his proposal, Wardell explicitly excluded psychotropic medications
from those that would be suitable for his proposal, because these medications
are usually used by chronically ill patients for long periods of time, making
it unsuitable to bring them to market without further testing of safety and
ecacy. However, this objection ignores the fact that the clinical testing done in
Phase III uses only four to six week trials, providing no additional information
about long-term use than that already obtained in Phase H testing. Thus,
a better procedure would require tests of a longer duration during Phase II,
approximating more closely the normal conditions of use, and then proceeding
to review the data for approval to market.
A more compelling objection is that lengthening the time taken for clinical
trials exposes those control patients taking placebos to an unacceptable length
of time without any treatment. Any use of placebos with control patients is
ethically problematic, though,276 and the objections raised here are no less valid
than they are when raised about all drug testing. To remedy the problem in
this context, one of two adequate and well-controlled investigations could test
the
275 Supra notes 158-174 and accompanying text.
276 Supra, note 166.
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80drug with a placebo in a shorter trial, while the other adequate and well-
controlled investigation could test the drug against a standard treatment in
a longer trial.
3. Improving Postmarketing Surveillance
Ry decreasing the amount of premarketing data required, the FDA would
have to shift its resources toward greater postmarketing surveillance in order to
maintain a safe and ecacious drug supply. The FDA has made great strides
in this regard by implementing the MEDWATCH system, however, US rates of
reporting by physicians remain low.277 Though the FDA has undertaken to com-
bat the problems that are perceived to be the reasons for non-reporting,278 any
shift away from premarketing processes and toward a reliance on postmarketing
surveillance will have to address the problem of low reporting rates. 279
277 American Medical Association, supra note 51, at 361. Several reasons
are given for this: a lack of awareness of how MED WATCH works, complacency
about drug safety, fear of legal liability, guilt about having harmed a patient,
and uncertainty about causation. Id
278 For example, the rule pre-empting state and local law on disclosure of
MED WATCH reports is an eort to address physicians' fears of legal liability
if their reports to the FDA are discovered.
279 A study reported in the JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL
ASSOCIATION and
conducted under the auspices of the FDA attempted to determine what
would stimulate physicians to become more active in submitting adverse drug
reaction (ADR) reports. The study involved the Rhode Island Department of
Health's pilot program for increasing ADR.s through professional educational
mailings, use of easy to read forms, presentations to health care professionals,
and a series of articles in medical journals. The researchers concluded that
physicians can be stimulated to increase their reporting of suspected reactions,
thereby improving the viability of the federal reporting system. Scott et al.,
supra note 53, at 1788. The study appears to have guided the development of
the MED WATCH program. Many of the methods used in the Rhode Island
study were used by the FDA when it launched the program in 1993. See supra,
note 48 and accompanying text.
Because MEDWATCH reporting is currently voluntary, it may be necessary
to consider more stringent measures to obtain reports from health professionals.
One suggestion
(continued...)
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81One objection to relying more heavily on postmarketing surveillance than on
premarketing scientic proof of safety and ecacy is that postmarketing surveil-
lance, relying as it does on anecdotal reporting rather than scientic studies,
can lead to erroneous conclusions about a drug and to errors in judgment about
whether or not to remove a drug from the market.280 Indeed, throughout the
crisis with Prozac, Lilly often argued that the reports of suicidal ideation and
homicidal tendencies were merely anecdotal and did not prove that Prozac was
responsible, because controlled clinical studies were necessary to establish a
causal link between violent behavior and Prozac.
While this is true, anecdotal reports do already form the basis of many of
the labeling changes that occur for drugs.28' Moreover, some researchers have
found that informed evaluations of the anecdotal reports at the time they are
made can yield good data for a regulatory
279(. continued)
might be to condition the receipt of Medicare funds on full-edged partic-
ipation in MIEDWATCH. While such a policy might not inuence individual
health care providers, it would almost certainly aect a health care organiza-
tion's policies. HMOs and hospitals would thus become the primary enforcers
of MED WATCH reporting. Another suggestion would be to make reporting by
individual health care providers mandatory. Such a policy would have problems
of enforcement and could result in reports that are uninterpretable, as providers
would have an incentive to over-report in order to avoid penalties for failure to
report.
280 See G.R Venning, Validity of Anecdotal Reports of Suspected Adverse
Drug Reactions The Problem of False Alarms, 284 BRJT. MED. J. 249 (1982)
(nding that the validity of anecdotal reports are often challenged on the grounds
that they may be false alanns).
281 Kessler, supra note 46 (using several specic examples to demonstrate
that voluntary reports of adverse drug reactions or product problems has led to
warnings to the manufacturer, labeling changes, requirements for postmarketing
studies and product withdrawals; also, reporting that lack of reporting can delay
problem detection, as with silicone breast implants).
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82agency to determine the need for action on a drug.282 Venning looked at anec-
dotal reports received on certain drugs during the initial years of their mar-
keting and compared the anecdotal reports with later veriable information on
the drug's eects in order to determine how often initial anecdotal reports are
actually false alarms. The study showed that anecdotal reports yielded 70%
true positives, with no absolute proof of false positives.2 ~The data also showed,
though, that if there was not an informed, commonsense evaluation of each new
anecdotal report at the time it was made, then as many as two-thirds of the
reports are false alarms, making anecdotal reports meaningless.2&$ Venning
therefore concluded that clear criteria for assessing the reports when they are
made could yield good data on which a regulatory agency could base decisions
about a drug. Thus, relying heavily on postmarketing surveillance will still
ensure that the American drug supply is safe and eective, provided that the
postmarketing surveillance system is strong and capable of regularly providing
useful information to the FDA.
Finally, the FDA should consider postmarketing surveillance through patient
self. monitoring. Relying on the work of Fisher et al., this proposal advocates
that the FDA give patients instructions on reporting adverse eects directly to
a hotline number and encourage them do so. Fisher et al. designed a study
to develop new methods for collecting postmarketing surveillance data from
outpatients.285 Patients receiving a new prescription for one of two
282 Venning, supra note 280, at 251.
283 Id
284 Id
285 Seymour Fisher et al., New Approaches to Postmarketing Surveillance,
90 PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 347, 349 (1986) [hereinafter New Approaches].
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83categories of drugs { tricydic antidepressants or antibiotics { were asked to
participate in the study. Half ofthe patients were asked to call a toll-free number
to report any new or unusual symptoms during the rst two weeks of taking the
drug. The other half were contacted two weeks after receiving the prescription
and were interviewed to determine any adverse drug reactions while taking the
medication. The results of the study showed that patient reports are quite
reliable.286 In fact, the study detected a previously unknown adverse clinical
event associated with one of the antibiotics?87 The small number of patients
taking the antibiotic in question prevented a determination as to whether or not
the adverse clinical event was in fact an M)D~Z8a Fisher et al. have conducted
other studies as well~ and have concluded that what they call the self-monitoring
surveillance approach is useful primarily as a signaling method, capable
286 Id
287 Id at 347. Under the terminology used by Fisher et al., adverse clinical
events are adverse events that occur during the course of administration of a
drug. When an event is classied as an adverse clinical event, it is unclear
whether or not the drug is responsible for the event. Once a determination is
made as to causation, an adverse clinical event is termed an ADR (adverse drug
reaction).
288 Id.
289 Seymour Fisher et al., Postmarketing Surveillance by Patient Self-Monitoring:
Trazodone Versus Fluoxetine, 13 J. CLIN. PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY
235 (1993) (reporting that patient self-reporting generated a list of adverse
clinical experiences associated with uoxetine use that was not detailed in the
labeling information, including suicidal ideation, anger and aggression, and delu-
sions and hallucinations) [hereinafter Trazodone Versus Fluoxetine]; Seymour
Fisher et al., Patient Attributions and Postmarketing Surveillance, 14 PHAR-
MACOTHERAPY 202 (1994) (concluding that patients' judgments as to drug
causality can add an independent component to the validity of at least one. ..
approach to detecting ADRs) [hereinafter Patient Attributions]; and, Seymour
Fisher et at Postmarlceting Surveillance by Patient Self-Monitoring: Prelimi-
nary Data for Sertraline Versus Fluoxetine, 56 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY
288 (1995) (comparing patient reports of adverse eects associated with uox-
etine and sertraline, the second of the SSRIs to be marketed, and noting that
sertraline, not uoxetine, had a more troublesome adverse eect prole than
uoxetine) [hereinafter Sertraline Versus Fluoxetine].
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84of obtaining early reliable and accurate postmarketing patient reports about
possible side eects.290
Based on the data obtained in the Fisher studies, it is clear that providing
a means for patients to report adverse eects on their own is an important
supplement to the current postmarketing surveillance system, because obtaining
information directly from patients provides reliable and informative evidence of
the eects associated with drugs on the market. While patients are theoretically
capable of reporting an adverse event through MEDWATCH., the FDA has
only encouraged reporting by health professionals.291 By establishing a system
for patients to report, the FDA could supplement the underreporting by health
professionals.292 In tandem, the two systems could provide sucient information
to monitor a drug's safety and ecacy that would allow the FDA to obtain a
more complete prole of a new drug in more rapid time.
As these researchers acknowledge, setting up a system would be problematic
and costly. The authors themselves say that such a system may not be practical.
293 For example, Fisher et aL used a thorough interview in their studies, which
was designed to make a clear determination at the time of the report that the
patient's adverse experience was in fact an ADR A system that thorough would
be complex and costly to start, because of the need for individualized interviews
290 Sertraline Versus Fluoxetine, supra note 289, at 295.
291 Supra, notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
292 No system would seem to be capable of providing complete information.
Indeed,
Fisher and et aL note that their studies miss the adverse drug reactions
which cause the patient to switch or to be switched from the medication in
question to another medication. They also note that they miss those patients
who may have become accustomed to an adverse reaction and not reported it.
Sertraline Versus Fluoxetine, supra note 289, at 295.
293 New Approaches, supra note 285, at 350.
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85for each drug on the market.294 Developing the interview material could easily
be combined with the sponsor's obligation to submit sample labeling informa-
tion. The program could spin o of the current MEDWATCH program, making
it easier to implement, and could rely on pharmacists to inform patients how to
submit reports to the FDA. Alternatively, the reports, combined with the use of
the individualized interview, could be made to pharmacists (essentially, phar-
macists would operate the hot-line number for patient reporting), who would
then relay the information to the
FDA.
One objection that might arise in considering a patient self-monitoring pro-
gram is that any controversy similar to the Prozac controversy would so taint a
patient-reporting surveillance system that the information provided by patients
would be more likely to reect the media hysteria than actual adverse expe-
nences. However, Fisher et al. conducted Trazodone Versus Fluoxetine in the
wake of the Prozac controversy and concluded that patients reporting adverse
experiences with uoxetine were not reacting to media spotlights.295 In fact,
after conducting another study of patient self-reporting of adverse eects asso-
ciated with uoxetine use, these researchers drew the conclusion that patient
self-reporting could have helped to ameliorate the Prozac controversy:
294 Each drug on the market would have an individualized interview designed
to elicit information necessary to determine whether or not there is an ADR that
would be used when a patient called in an adverse drug experience. This does
not seem to be an insurmountable practical problem, given the state of computer
technology.
295 Trazodone Versus Fluoxetine, supra note 289, at 241. The study found
that
reports of adverse eects that the media also reported, such as suicidal
ideation and aggressive urges, were more frequently reported by trazodone users.
The most frequent reports by uoxetine users reported adverse eects that had
never been reported in the media, such as hallucinations and delusions. Id
84
86We submit that much of the media circus that created serious public concern
during the past few years by spotlighting two widely prescribed psychoactive
agents (one a hypnotic, the other an antidepressant) could have been averted
ifa mechanism for systematically obtaining accurate patient reports had been in
place at FDA-approval time, rather than relying on spontaneous reports from
physicians, published case reports, or record-linkage systems.296
The most vigorous objection to such a proposal may come from the medical
community, arguing that setting up a separate system for patients to report
their problems directly to the FDA constitutes government interference with the
physician-patient relationship and that any problems with medication should
be reported directly to the physician. This objection parallels the strenuous
objection raised in response to the FDA's requirement that certain drugs contain
patient package inserts (PPIs), which were to provide more information about
drugs directly to patients rather than through a physician.297 Critics of the
plan for PPIs argued that it would be too costly and would interfere with the
practice of medicine. While mandatory compliance with a PPI requirement
failed, the debate opened up the voluntary use of PPIs for drugs which present
unique safety questions.298 Thus, even if patient self-monitoring is too dicult
or costly to implement for all drugs, it could be implemented for certain drugs
for which more information would almost certainly be needed. Fluoxetine would
have been the perfect candidate for such a
296 Patient Attributions, supra note 289, at 208. The unnamed references
to psychoactive agents are undoubtedly references to Prozac and to Halcion, a
sleeping pill that encountered a controversy similar to that of Prozac at about
the same time.
297 The FDA issued the requirement on the grounds that patients would be
better able to use the drugs safely and eectively and better informed about the
risks and benets of the medication. Hutt and Merrill, supra note 8, at 444. A
more thorough analysis of the debate over PPIs would provide valuable insights
into the feasibility of patient self-monitoring of ADRs. For more information on
the debate, see Id at 438-50.
298 Id at 450.
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87system. As the rst of a new class of antidepressants about which little was
understood, patient self-monitoring would have provided additional necessary
information that could have helped to determine much earlier how patients
responded to the new cluster of side eects and to determine whether or not
those responses were dangerous. Moreover, as the data on adverse eects was
so limited, patient self-monitoring would have provided additional data needed
to develop a more complete and thorough understanding of the side eects
associated with uoxetine use.
Vt. Conclusion
The case of Prozac makes it clear that, at least for antidepressant drugs, reform
of the FDA drug approval process could be shortened by decreasing the preclin-
ical and clinical test data required and improving postmarketing surveillance
to insure that they are safe and eective in the general population. The case
of Prozac has also shown why current reform proposals are insucient to ad-
dress the shortcomings of the current system. Finally, this paper has advocated
a new approach for deciding how to reform the drug approval process, with
the expectation that this approach will yield better results and a more ecient
process.
Prozac's story is not unique. Other drugs, such as the controversial sleeping
pill Halcion, have experienced the same treatment from the public as Prozac.
Also, antipsychotic drugs, used to treat schizophrenia and related illnesses, suer
from having to undergo the same generic approval process that does not account
for special issues related to this class of drugs, such as the lack of good animal
models of schizophrenia. The arguments developed within this paper, then,
apply to more than the limited case of Prozac. Reform of the FDA drug approval
process should, therefore, account for those arguments and should be considered
in the context of more than just AIDS drugs and drug lag.
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